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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND THE 
RIGHT TO REPAIR 
By Leah Chan Grinvald* & Ofer Tur-Sinai** 
 
This Article posits that intellectual property law should accommodate 
consumers’ right to repair their products.  In recent years, there has been a 
growing push towards state legislation that would provide consumers with a 
“right to repair” their products.  Currently, twenty states have pending 
legislation that would require product manufacturers to make available 
replacement parts and repair manuals.  Unfortunately, though, this 
legislation has stalled in many of the states.  Manufacturers have been 
lobbying the legislatures to stop the enactment of these repair laws based on 
different concerns, including how these laws may impinge on their 
intellectual property rights.  Indeed, a right to repair may not be easily 
reconcilable with the United States’ far-reaching intellectual property rights 
regime.  For example, requiring manufacturers to release repair manuals 
could implicate a whole host of intellectual property laws, including trade 
secrets.  Similarly, employing measures that undercut a manufacturer’s 
control of the market for replacement parts might conflict with patent 
exclusivity. 
Nonetheless, this Article holds that intellectual property laws should not 
be used to prevent a right to repair from being fully implemented.  In support 
of this claim, this Article develops a theoretical framework that justifies a 
right to repair in a manner that is consistent with intellectual property 
protection.  Based on this theoretical foundation, this Article then explores, 
for the first time, the various intellectual property rules and doctrines that 
may be implicated in the context of the current repair movement.  As part of 
this analysis, this Article identifies areas where intellectual property rights 
could prevent repair laws from being fully realized, even if some of the states 
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pass the legislation, and recommends certain reforms that are necessary to 
accommodate the need for a right to repair and enable it to take hold. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The consumer technology products business is big.  In 2018, the Consumer 
Technology Association reported that the industry generated $351 billion in 
retail revenue.1  A contributing factor to the size of this industry is that almost 
all consumer products and equipment include some type of technology in the 
form of an electronic component or computer chip.  Your Keurig coffee 
maker?  It has a computer chip.2  Your Honda CR-V?  It has multiple types 
of electronics and technology embedded into it.3  The same holds true in 
 
 1. CONSUMER TECH. ASS’N, BRINGING INNOVATORS TOGETHER:  2018 CORPORATE 
REPORT 2–3 (2018), https://lsc-pagepro.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?i=495372# 
[https://perma.cc/2D7J-5H6K].  To put this in perspective, this would account for 
approximately 3 percent of the overall retail sales in the United States based on 2018 third 
quarter data. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS:  
QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 3RD QUARTER 2018 (2018) (stating that the total 
retail sales for the third quarter in 2018 were estimated to be $1340.2 billion). 
 2. Juliana Kenny, Keurig Under Fire for Use of DRM in New Coffee Makers,  
LAW.COM:  INSIDE COUNS. (Mar. 4, 2014, 4:55 AM), https://www.law.com/insidecounsel/ 
sites/insidecounsel/2014/03/04/keurig-under-fire-for-use-of-drm-in-new-coffee-makers/ 
[https://perma.cc/9PR6-L5HJ]. 
 3. See, e.g., Jeff Plungis, Honda Delays CR-V Engine Fix but Details Rollout Plans, 
CONSUMER REP. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/car-repair-maintenance/ 
honda-delays-cr-v-turbo-engine-fix-details-rollout-plans/ [https://perma.cc/29MN-9942] 
(detailing the many parts that contain technology).  While this Article focuses primarily on 
electronics, it will also discuss repair and intellectual property with respect to other goods—
66 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
many other areas of consumer products.4  As a corollary to this, gone are the 
days when an at-home do-it-yourselfer could unscrew the back of the coffee 
maker and fix it with a few tools.  With embedded computer chips, software, 
and other technology, specialized knowledge and tools are now needed to 
make simple repairs.  Therefore, it is likely not surprising that the repair 
business is big, too.  According to some estimates, the repair business 
constitutes up to 3 percent of the U.S. economy.5 
Unfortunately for consumers, manufacturers have been taking advantage 
of this product complexity to stymie the do-it-yourselfer and independent 
repair shop from making repairs in a variety of different ways.  Many 
manufacturers maintain an “authorized” network of repair shops, which 
consumers are required to use for repairs during a product’s warranty period.6  
Joining the network is typically difficult and expensive.7  While this practice 
in itself may be viewed as based on a legitimate concern for quality control, 
it becomes more troubling when manufacturers couple it with obscure repair 
information and a refusal to supply replacement parts in the open market.8 
In addition, some manufacturers utilize their intellectual property rights to 
tighten their control over the repair market for their products.  For example, 
certain manufacturers place microscopic trademarks on repair parts that are 
 
like cars—given the importance of the issue.  To a large extent, the same issues can arise with 
respect to other goods as well. 
 4. This Article focuses on all forms of “consumer products” that rely on some form of 
an electronic chip embedded in or attached to the product.  Generally speaking, these products 
are more difficult to repair than products that do not depend on electronics.  While this 
category includes the ubiquitous smartphones made by Apple and Samsung, there is a wide 
array of other products that belong to this category, including, for example, electric razors 
made by Wahl, vacuum cleaners made by Dyson, insulin pumps made by Medtronic, and even 
farm tractors made by John Deere.  Recently, some companies, like Amazon, have begun to 
create chips that can be inserted into electronic products that did not previously have the 
capacity to communicate with voice-activated assistants, like Alexa, which makes these 
products even more technologically complicated. See Laura Stevens, Amazon to Offer Alexa-
Enabled Chip to Electronics Manufacturers, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 20, 2018, 5:17 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/amazon-to-offer-alexa-enabled-chip-to-electronics-
manufacturers-2018-09-20 [https://perma.cc/MW3R-RBBN]. 
 5. See Kyle Wiens, Copyright Office Ruling Issues Sweeping Right to Repair Reforms, 
IFIXIT (Oct. 25, 2018), https://ifixit.org/blog/11951/1201-copyright-final-rule/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TJF9-ZXVX] (stating that “repair jobs represent 3% of overall employment” in the 
United States); see also Alex Fitzpatrick, Hand Me That Wrench:  Farmers and Apple Fight 
Over the Toolbox, TIME (June 22, 2017), http://time.com/4828099/farmers-and-apple-fight-
over-the-toolbox/ [https://perma.cc/EZW9-SJKY] (stating that Apple makes approximately 
$1 billion to $2 billion per year in fixing iPhones). 
 6. See generally Apple Authorized Service Provider Program, APPLE, 
https://support.apple.com/en-hk/aasp-program [https://perma.cc/2C4H-J8MK] (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2019). 
 7. See Jason Koebler, Do You Know Anything About Apple’s Authorized Service 
Provider Program?, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 16, 2017, 12:21 PM), https:// 
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ypkqxw/do-you-know-anything-about-apples-
authorized-service-provider-program [https://perma.cc/8SCN-FG2U]. 
 8. See A “Right to Repair” Movement Tools Up, ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2017/09/30/a-right-to-repair-movement-tools-up 
[https://perma.cc/752Z-CN24]. 
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not seen (nor are they intended to be seen) by consumers in order to control 
their importation for repair purposes.9  While this may be technically legal, 
such use of a trademark to suppress repairs exceeds the traditionally accepted 
purpose for trademarks, which is to promote competition and assist 
consumers in identifying the source of goods.10  Furthermore, manufacturers 
have issued cease-and-desist letters or take down requests when consumers 
or independent vendors have attempted to spread the knowledge of repair by 
posting information online.11  Some manufacturers also sue replacement 
parts manufacturers for patent infringement12 or utilize the services of the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection to seize replacement parts at the border 
on the premise that the parts are counterfeit.13 
Consumer frustration with this interference into their personal autonomy 
is apparent.  In the words of one individual at a public hearing on this issue:  
“it’s my own damn car, I paid for it, I should be able to repair it or have the 
person of my choice do it for me.”14  To address this frustration and combat 
the hostage-taking of consumer product markets, a social movement 
demanding a “right to repair” has sprung up and has gained steam in the last 
five years.15  The movement has several branches, with one branch focused 
 
 9. See Jason Koebler, DHS Seizes iPhone Screens from Prominent Right-to-Repair 
Advocate, VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (May 11, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/evk4wk/dhs-seizes-iphone-screens-jessa-jones [https://perma.cc/LJ36-JFN7].  
For example, Apple routinely places microscopic “Apple” logos on internal iPhone repair 
parts (parts that consumers do not see because they cannot even open their phones) in order to 
claim that an independent repairer is “counterfeiting” when using such parts to refurbish or 
repair an iPhone. See id. 
 10. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (“One [goal] is to protect the public so it may be 
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably 
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.”); Koebler, supra note 9; see 
also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right:  Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466–67 (2005); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 271 (1988) (“[A] trademark conveys 
information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need not investigate the attributes 
of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me 
that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690 (1999); 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 421, 432 (1999); I. P. L. 
Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & ECON. 
207, 208–11 (1995). 
 11. Timothy B. Lee, When Tech Companies Won’t Provide Service Manuals, This Guy 
Writes His Own, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/01/13/when-tech-companies-wont-provide-service-manuals-this-guy-writes-
his-own/ [https://perma.cc/3G2V-9U6J] (recounting Kyle Wiens’s experience). 
 12. See, e.g., Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-3201-N, 
2018 WL 5786157, at *3–5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2018) (finding in favor of Ford on summary 
judgment on the ground of design patent infringement against the manufacturer of similar 
parts).  The authors thank Professor Sarah Burstein for bringing this case to our attention. 
 13. See, e.g., Koebler, supra note 9. 
 14. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING:  SEVENTH TRIENNIAL 
PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 3 (2018). 
 15. See About Us:  The Association, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org/association 
[https://perma.cc/RD3V-C78R] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (stating that the association was 
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on pushing a “right to repair” or “fair repair” through state legislatures.16  
Another branch of the movement is focused on amending the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act17 (DMCA), which has provided yet another major 
legal ground for manufacturers to block repairs.18  The primary justifications 
for the legislation offered by the movement include environmental concerns, 
consumer autonomy, and competition.19 
In the last two years, the movement has seen some success:  as of the date 
of this Article, right to repair bills have been introduced in twenty states.20  
These right to repair laws would require manufacturers of consumer 
electronics (defined rather broadly) to enable consumers and independent 
repair shops to repair consumer products.21  Towards this goal, the legislation 
would require manufacturers to make available, on fair and reasonable terms, 
repair information, parts, and tools.  As of the date of this Article, no state 
has voted to enact the legislation.  In fact, there are signs that the legislation 
has stalled in some states.22  One plausible explanation may be that the large 
 
formed in 2013); Adam Wernick, The ‘Right to Repair’ Movement Wants You to Be Able to 
Fix Your Own Stuff, PRI (Dec. 24, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-24/ 
right-repair-movement-wants-you-be-able-fix-your-own-stuff [https://perma.cc/97QJ-PYPE] 
(“America’s throw-away culture has expanded in the last decade from everyday products and 
food to include consumer electronics—from iPhones to big-screen TVs.  In response, a ‘Right 
to Repair’ movement is now advocating for laws that allow people to fix the things they 
own.”). 
 16. See Advocacy:  Legislation, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org/legislation [https:// 
perma.cc/BV9L-BVLK] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 17, 
28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 18. See Kyle Wiens, Forget the Cellphone Fight—We Should Be Allowed to Unlock 
Everything We Own, WIRED (Mar. 18, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/you-
dont-own-your-cellphones-or-your-cars/ [https://perma.cc/3Y2T-PXUZ].  This branch of the 
movement has seen some success lately. See infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. 
 19. It’s Time for a Common-Sense Perspective, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org/policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/7LPC-G567] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019); see also Repair Manifesto, 
IFIXIT.COM, https://www.ifixit.com/Manifesto [https://perma.cc/UEK8-AXMU] (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2019). 
 20. Matthew Gault, Bernie Sanders Calls for a National Right-to-Repair Law for 
Farmers, VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/8xzqmp/bernie-sanders-calls-for-a-national-right-to-repair-law-for-farmers 
[https://perma.cc/T7QG-BCJD].  In addition, at least two Democratic Party presidential 
hopefuls have called for a national right to repair law.  While these calls are focused on 
farmers, the implications for other consumers are promising. See id.; Makena Kelly, Elizabeth 
Warren Comes Out in Support of a National Right-to-Repair Law for Farm Equipment, VERGE 
(Mar. 27, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27/18284011/elizabeth-
warren-apple-right-to-repair-john-deere-law-presidential-campaign-iowa 
[https://perma.cc/B4QV-95L4]. 
 21. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, REPAIR ASS’N § 3(a)–(b) (July 24, 2018), 
https://repair.org/s/Right-to-repair-Model-state-law-7-24-18.docx [https://perma.cc/ME8E-
9243]. 
 22. See Brian Abel, ‘Right to Repair’ Bills Stall in MO, KS, KSHB (Apr. 25, 2017, 8:12 
PM), https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/right-to-repair-bills-stall-in-mo-ks [https:// 
perma.cc/AZ64-7XP3]; Ewan Spence, Apple Fights to Protect Public from Their Dangerous 
iPhone, FORBES (May 1, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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manufacturers have been lobbying against this legislation.23  In arguing 
against the proposed laws, manufacturers have cited intellectual property 
rights concerns, as well as safety,24 as the main reasons to allow them to 
retain control over repairs.25 
In response, the repair movement continues to stress the importance of 
enacting a right to repair, while brushing aside, for the most part, any 
intellectual property concerns.26  To be sure, the repair movement recognizes 
that a right to repair may impact intellectual property rights.  However, on 
the whole, the movement does not tie the two worlds together and does not 
sufficiently address the potential clash between the two regimes.27 
While the justifications brought by the repair movement in support of the 
legislation are convincing, the case for a right to repair can be bolstered even 
further.28  To counter the manufacturers’ strong objections, this Article offers 
an analytical framework that justifies a right to repair in terms that are 
consistent with intellectual property protection.  As a first step in this 
direction, this Article shows how seemingly external policy considerations 
supporting repair—like environmental concerns and consumer autonomy—
can nevertheless be accounted for, and woven into, intellectual property law 
and policymaking in a manner that preserves a space for a right to repair.  
Beyond that, this Article reveals that a right to repair can be supported by 
internal justifications—i.e., theories that are commonly used to justify 
intellectual property protection, including ones rooted in utilitarianism and 
others.  Thus, a right to repair could, in fact, be not just compatible with 
 
ewanspence/2019/05/01/apple-iphone-right-to-repair-parts-legislation-fight-dangerous-tim-
cook/ [https://perma.cc/96T8-ZA6U]. 
 23. See Alex Fitzpatrick, Hand Me That Wrench:  Farmers and Apple Fight Over the 
Toolbox, TIME (June 22, 2017), http://time.com/4828099/farmers-and-apple-fight-over-the-
toolbox/ [https://perma.cc/6EX3-FK96]. 
 24. Both personal and cyber safety have been raised as part of manufacturers’ purported 
concerns. See Spence, supra note 22.  The repair movement has been attempting to provide a 
direct rebuttal to these concerns. See, e.g., Louise Matsakis, Security Experts Unite Over the 
Right to Repair, WIRED (Apr. 30, 2019, 9:51 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/right-to-
repair-security-experts-california/ [https://perma.cc/63G8-QH62].  As reported in this Wired 
article, a new group—Securepairs.org—was founded in order to counter the claims that 
providing repair information would increase the likelihood of cyberattacks. See Statement of 
Principles, SECUREPAIRS.ORG, https://securepairs.org/statement-of-principles/#obscurity 
[https://perma.cc/UFC6-BJG8] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 25. See Nicholas Deleon, Right-to-Repair Laws Could Make It Easier to Get a Phone or 
Laptop Fixed, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-
protection/right-to-repair-laws-could-make-it-easier-to-get-a-phone-or-laptop-fixed/ 
[https://perma.cc/YCU9-475P]. 
 26. In fact, the model legislation itself references trade secrets but no other kind of 
intellectual property. See Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21, § 5. 
 27. See It’s Time for a Common-Sense Perspective, supra note 19 (placing “Fix the 
DMCA” into a different category from “Policy Objectives”). 
 28. While this Article embraces the term “right to repair,” in accord with proposed 
legislation, this does not necessarily mean to suggest that the nature of consumers’ legal 
entitlement in this context must be structured as a “right” in the strict Hohfeldian sense.  For 
a discussion, see infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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intellectual property law but rather essential for it to achieve its prescribed 
goals.  This novel theoretical basis for a right to repair can make the case for 
this right even stronger and help state policymakers to handle the 
manufacturers’ objections on the intellectual property front. 
Based on the theoretical discussion of the justifications for a right to repair, 
this Article then maps the various intellectual property rights that could be 
implicated by a right to repair.  Such a broad exploration is necessary to 
reveal any potential overshadowing of the state legislation efforts by federal 
intellectual property laws.  For the purposes of the analysis, this Article 
visualizes the notion of a right to repair as concentric circles, beginning at 
the core with a personal right to repair one’s own products, while each circle 
adds other elements of such right.  After the core, the second circle includes 
the freedom to engage in other activities that facilitate repairs, including 
diffusion of repair information and advertising repair businesses.  The third 
circle includes the right to manufacture, import, sell, and use replacement 
parts in competition with the original manufacturer.  Finally, the outer circle 
includes the right to mandate original manufacturers to disclose repair 
information and supply replacement parts.  Regarding each circle, this Article 
explores the rules and doctrines that may impede any state-based legislation 
and offer suggestions as to changes, both within intellectual property law and 
in the state legislation.29 
This Article is the first to examine the current repair movement in the 
context of U.S. intellectual property laws.  Other scholarly and policy articles 
have touched upon the interface between repairs and intellectual property 
law, but the majority of these pieces have focused on one particular area of 
intellectual property law, such as patents or copyright.30  The few papers that 
have examined this area from a more general viewpoint were written before 
the rise of the current repair movement.31  This Article aims to take a fresh, 
holistic look at intellectual property and a right to repair in an attempt to 
reconcile the two.  This Article ultimately concludes that intellectual property 
laws can, and should, be construed in a manner that does not prevent a right 
to repair from being fully implemented. 
 
 29. While there are international implications and the fight to repair consumer products is 
global, this Article will focus mostly on U.S. law, given the space constraints. 
 30. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, White Paper on Protecting the Consumer Patent Law 
Right of Repair and the Aftermarket for Exterior Motor Vehicle Repair Parts:  The PARTS 
Act, S. 812, H.R. 1879, 115th Congress (Nov. 2017) (unpublished white paper), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082289 [https://perma.cc/KE3J-6HNM] 
(focusing on patent law).  The inability to repair one’s consumer product is discussed as a 
consumer harm in a forthcoming article:  Christopher Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron 
Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 30–34). 
 31. For a prominent treatment of related issues, see generally Pamela Samuelson, 
Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 (2016). See also Estelle Derclaye, 
Repair and Recycle Between IP Rights, End User License Agreements and Encryption, in 
SPARES, REPAIRS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 21, 21–56 (Christopher Heath & 
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2009). 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I explores the 
repair social movement and analyzes the proposed state legislation and the 
manufacturers’ efforts to forestall it.  Part II develops a novel theoretical 
framework that justifies a right to repair in a manner reconcilable with 
intellectual property protection.  Part III explores various areas of intellectual 
property law that are implicated by different aspects of a right to repair.  
Based on the analysis, this Article provides suggestions on where these rules, 
doctrines, or laws could be reinterpreted, revised, or amended to enable a full 
implementation of a right to repair.  Finally, Part IV provides responses to 
some of the counterarguments that are raised in the right to repair debate and 
could be used to criticize this Article’s thesis—such as the concern regarding 
the quality of repairs, the fear that requiring manufacturers to provide repair 
information or replacement parts would increase counterfeiting, and the 
potential detrimental economic impact to manufacturers as a result of 
opening the repair market to competition.  A brief conclusion follows. 
I.  THE REPAIR SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND RIGHT TO REPAIR LEGISLATION 
A.  The Repair Social Movement 
In the last few years, a new consumer rights movement focused on a right 
to repair consumer products has sprouted up.32  The main organization 
behind the repair movement is the Repair Association, which was officially 
founded in July 2013 as the Digital Right to Repair Coalition.33  Its members 
include industry organizations and companies that have been impacted by the 
inability to freely repair, reuse, and recycle consumer electronic parts or 
products.34  In addition to the larger players behind the Repair Association, 
there are individual consumers and consumer-rights groups.35  These include 
some unlikely partners, such as farmers.  In 2017, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation adopted a policy to address the right of farmers to fix their own 
farm equipment and has lobbied for this at the federal level.36  Farmer 
 
 32. This movement is new in its focus on consumer products, although it has its roots in 
the movement to repair automobiles.  In fact, the current social movement references the 
success of the previous movement as the basis for its current strategy. See The Repair 
Association, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org [https://perma.cc/9SVX-JDEA] (last visited Aug. 
22, 2019) (“86% of voters in Massachusetts overrode big car companies and passed the 
Automobile Owners’ Right to Repair in 2012.”). 
 33. About Us:  History, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org/history/ [https://perma.cc/KV86-
4R77] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 34. About Us:  Members, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org/members-1/ [https://perma.cc/ 
E825-RYCS] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 35. Benefits, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org/benefits/ [https://perma.cc/79XY-Z8LL] (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 36. Kaleigh Rogers, The ‘Right to Repair’ Movement Is Being Led by Farmers, VICE:  
MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 31, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
kbgzgz/farmers-right-to-repair [https://perma.cc/MEV6-W4K5]. 
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“hacktivists” routinely hack their John Deere agricultural machinery in order 
to repair their equipment and harvest their crops in a timely fashion.37 
This repair movement has gained steam in the last three years, with its 
success leading twenty states (as of the date of this Article) to introduce 
legislation that would guarantee consumers a right to repair their electronic 
equipment.38  The Repair Association has lobbied for their model legislation 
to be the basis for state laws.39  This Article will parse this model legislation 
in Part I.C below.  As will be seen, the main thrust of the model legislation 
is to require manufacturers of consumer electronic equipment to make 
available repair information, tools, and parts.40 
The movement is inspired—at least to a certain extent—by the successful 
campaign that led to the passage of a 2012 Massachusetts law providing for 
the right to repair automobiles.41  After Massachusetts passed this law, the 
automobile industry voluntarily agreed to work with independent car repair 
shops nationwide.42  While this voluntary agreement has been successful in 
providing independent repair shops with the ability to repair cars, this 
agreement has been frustrated in recent years by tactics employed by car 
manufacturers that are enabled by the growing use of software, electronic 
components, and wireless technologies in the car industry.43 
To date, no state has passed the legislation, and some reports suggest that 
the movement has stalled in legislatures.44  The reports point to behind-the-
scenes lobbying by major manufacturers that would be forced to provide 
consumers with repair tools, parts, and information under the legislation.45  
 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Gault, supra note 20. 
 39. Advocacy:  Legislation, supra note 16. 
 40. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21. 
 41. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K (2019); see also Jonathan Ng, Independent Auto Repair 
Shops Want Right-to-Repair Law Updated, BOS. HERALD (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/06/18/independent-auto-repair-shops-want-right-to-
repair-law-updated/ [https://perma.cc/27JC-DXP6]. 
 42. See A “Right to Repair” Movement Tools Up, supra note 8 (“The hope is that once an 
important state passes such a law, the country will follow—as was the case in the car industry 
after Massachusetts in 2012 passed a right to repair law for cars that led to a national 
memorandum of understanding between carmakers and repair shops.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Matt Murphy, Bill Filed to Prevent Skirting Right-to-Repair Law, 
METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2018, 10:25 AM), https:// 
www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20180918/bill-filed-to-prevent-skirting-right-to-repair-
law [https://perma.cc/HJW3-DFQ5] (citing to a new bill introduced in the Massachusetts state 
legislature to prevent car manufacturers from evading the automotive right to repair law 
through increased use of wireless technology); see also Ng, supra note 41 (describing how the 
wireless data transfer of telematics is frustrating independent repair shops).  Unfortunately, 
the current repair movement exempts automobiles from its scope. See infra notes 74–75 and 
accompanying text. 
 44. See Abel, supra note 22. 
 45. Jason Koebler, Appliance Companies Are Lobbying to Protect Their DRM-Fueled 
Repair Monopolies, VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 25, 2018, 9:00 AM), https:// 
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbxk3b/appliance-companies-are-lobbying-against-
right-to-repair [https://perma.cc/W8LC-JEYA]. 
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Companies—such as Apple, Samsung, Dyson, Wahl, and LG—have 
privately lobbied in an attempt to prevent such legislation’s enactment.46  
These companies utilize different arguments, ranging from personal injuries 
caused by incorrect repairs to intellectual property rights concerns.47  In 
response, the repair movement has justified the legislation with a variety of 
arguments—including environmental, competition, and consumer autonomy 
concerns.48  As discussed below, these justifications from both sides appear 
to be at cross-purposes, which may account for the lack of state enactment of 
the pending laws.49  Before reaching this discussion, a dive into the reasons 
behind the current social movement is critical to understanding the 
justifications motivating the movement. 
B.  Why Now? 
Large manufacturers fighting against the ability of consumers to control 
(and repair) their consumable products is not a new phenomenon.  To 
illustrate, in 1956, after being accused of unfair practices that violated 
antitrust laws, IBM entered into a consent decree with the U.S. Department 
of Justice that required IBM to undertake actions that would allow consumers 
to repair their own machines, or at least choose who undertakes the repair.50 
Given this, the question becomes, why has the repair movement taken off 
in such a big way over the last few years?  There are a lot of possible 
explanations to this, but one of the main answers is that almost every 
consumer product nowadays has some type of electronic chip or other 
technology embedded in it.  This could make it hard, even for a do-it-
 
 46. See, e.g., Letter from Jason L. Brown, Vice President Gen. Counsel & Sec’y, Dyson, 
Inc., to David Harris, Ill. Gen. Assembly (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/4446373-DYSON-Illinois-Opposition.html [https://perma.cc/6XWG-2MGY]; 
Letter from Rick Habben, Safety Compliance Eng’r, Wahl Clipper Corp., to David Harris, Ill. 
Gen. Assembly (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4446374-Wahl-
Opposition-Illinois.html [https://perma.cc/6ZBU-9DX4]; Letter from John I. Taylor, Senior 
Vice President, Gov’t Relations, LG Elecs. USA, to David Harris, Ill. Gen. Assembly (Apr. 
18, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4446375-LG-LETTER-HB-4747-
2.html [https://perma.cc/AXA3-6GA6].  Not all companies are anti-repair.  For example, 
Motorola and iFixit, a prominent repair organization, announced a partnership in 2018. Elise 
Barsch, Motorola and iFixit—A Match Made in Mobile, IFIXIT (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.ifixit.com/News/motorola-ifixit-partnership [https://perma.cc/6RBM-XAWE]. 
 47. Letter from Jason L. Brown to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from Rick Habben 
to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from John I. Taylor to David Harris, supra note 46. 
 48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 49. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 50. IBM 1956 Consent Decree, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., http://www.cptech.org/ 
at/ibm/ibm1956cd.html [https://perma.cc/3EBJ-Q3MW] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (In the 
consent decree, the parties agreed “to offer to sell at reasonable and nondiscriminatory prices 
and terms, to owners of IBM tabulating or electronic data processing machines (whether or 
not the purchaser receives IBM repair and maintenance service) and to persons engaged in the 
business of maintaining and repairing such machines and during the period when IBM has 
such parts and subassemblies available for use in its leased machines, repair and replacement 
parts and subassemblies for any tabulating machines or electronic data processing machines 
manufactured by IBM.”). 
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yourselfer, to fix broken products without any support from the 
manufacturers.51 
Concomitantly with the “technologization” of consumer products, 
manufacturers of these products began to tighten their control of the 
aftermarket and claim that only authorized repair personnel (or the 
manufacturers themselves) are qualified to repair such products.52  Indeed, 
manufacturers have attempted to control repairs by various means, including 
refusing to release repair manuals or make repair parts available to 
independent repair shops and consumers and strictly enforcing authorized 
repair networks.53  All of these practices have led to the inability to easily 
obtain inexpensive and accessible repairs, which ultimately serves to channel 
consumers into throwing away their broken products and buying new ones.54 
In addition to tight controls on authorized repairs, manufacturers have been 
actively fighting against repairs at other levels, including use of their 
intellectual property rights to block repair activities.  Among other things, 
they have brought actions against small independent repair shops in the 
United States and abroad.55  Many of these actions are extrajudicial, as these 
small repair shops often settle prior to the filing of a lawsuit.  However, the 
few cases that make their way to the courts help illuminate the lengths to 
which manufacturers will go to control repairs. 
Apple’s tactics in a recent case in Norway may reflect a strategy taken by 
other manufacturers as well.56  Apple sued Henrik Huseby, the owner of a 
small Norwegian repair shop, on grounds of trademark infringement, after 
Huseby attempted to import sixty-three refurbished iPhone screens and 
refused to enter into a settlement agreement that would have required him to 
pay approximately $3400.57  Most small repair shops are unable to finance 
 
 51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., Val Galin, Nikon USA to Stop Distributing Camera Parts to Unauthorized 
Repair Shops, TOGTECH, http://www.togtech.com/nikon-usa-to-stop-distributing-camera-
parts-to-unauthorized-repair-shops/ [https://perma.cc/9AEK-MPZP] (last visited Aug. 22, 
2019). 
 53. See, e.g., Apple Authorized Service Provider Program, supra note 6 (listing as a 
benefit of the service provider program the ability to obtain repair parts:  “[o]nly Authorized 
Service Providers are able to obtain parts directly from Apple in order to complete repairs”). 
 54. See, e.g., Press Release, Susan Talamantes Eggman, Cal. State Assemblymember, 
Eggman Introduces Legislation to Create a “Right to Repair” for Electronics (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://a13.asmdc.org/press-releases/20180307-eggman-introduces-legislation-create-right-
repair-electronics [https://perma.cc/7YU6-C7T6]. 
 55. See Koebler, supra note 9. 
 56. See Jason Koebler, Apple Sued an Independent iPhone Repair Shop Owner and Lost, 
VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/ 
article/a3yadk/apple-sued-an-independent-iphone-repair-shop-owner-and-lost 
[https://perma.cc/C3GS-XYYQ].  Similar claims have been made by Apple in the United 
States. See Mike Masnick, ICE Starts Raiding Mobile Phone Repair Shops to Stop Repairs 
with Aftermarket Parts, TECHDIRT (Apr. 30, 2013, 8:28 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20130429/07214322874/homeland-security-participates-trademark-raid.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/PD6L-F6LQ]. 
 57. See Koebler, supra note 56.  Mr. Huseby subsequently won his case against Apple. 
See id. 
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litigation,58 and so it is likely that many would pay the $3400 just to make 
Apple go away, like Apple’s lawyer promised Huseby.59  Interestingly, 
Apple’s lawsuit relied on its claim that the refurbished parts were 
counterfeits.60  While different countries have different trademark laws, a 
refurbished part or product—one that was previously sold, broken, and then 
repaired by a third party—is not a counterfeit in the United States (and, as 
ultimately determined in Huseby’s case, not in Norway either).61  
Nevertheless, the fact that many manufacturers claim that independent repair 
shops are “counterfeiting” has a significant deterrent effect on repair shop 
proprietors because, among other things, counterfeiting may subject them to 
criminal action.62 
This strategy is not limited to trademarks.  Manufacturers have routinely 
utilized other intellectual property rights to control their products and prevent 
the allegedly unauthorized repairs of those products.63  To illustrate, Ford 
recently sued the marketer and distributor of its Mustang and F-150 car 
replacement parts for design patent infringement.64  As will be further 
discussed in Part III below, car manufacturers have been obtaining design 
patents on exterior parts to control repairs by independent repair shops or do-
it-yourselfers.65  With a patented replacement part, only Ford is allowed to 
make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import such part.66  This strategy works, as 
 
 58. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Charitable Trademarks, 50 AKRON L. REV. 817, 832–36 
(2017) (explaining that such litigation is expensive, time-consuming, and emotionally draining 
for small organizations). 
 59. See Koebler, supra note 56. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id.  In the United States, the “first sale” or “exhaustion” doctrine in trademark law 
generally allows the resale of products without the need for further authorization by the 
original manufacturer or trademark owner. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:41 (5th ed. 2019). See generally Champion 
Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 
341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
 62. Manufacturing or selling counterfeit products is a crime in the United States and in all 
countries that are signatories to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2012) (imposing criminal liability on counterfeiters); 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299. 
 63. For other examples, see supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. 
 64. See generally Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-3201-
N, 2018 WL 5786157 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2018).  Ford was later awarded damages in a 
subsequent proceeding. See Brooks Kushman Obtains Willful Infringement on 13 Design 
Patents on Behalf of Ford Motor Company, BROOKS KUSHMAN:  CASE STUD. (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https:// 
www.brookskushman.com/case-studies/case-studies/ford-global-technologies-llc-v-new-
world-international-inc/ [https://perma.cc/797T-CE8K]. 
 65. See infra Part III; see also Sarnoff, supra note 30. 
 66. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
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Ford was granted summary judgment on its infringement claims.67  Without 
widely available replacement parts that match the car’s overall design, Ford 
retains the sole control over the availability and pricing of such parts.  This 
likely forces consumers to have their cars repaired at authorized repair shops 
or pay significantly higher costs for repairs if the parts are made available at 
independent repair shops. 
In sum, different but related factors have contributed to the rise of the 
current repair movement:  the purposeful sabotaging of the ability to repair 
through withholding of information and parts, the increasing expense paid to 
fix one’s product through authorized channels, and the growing use by 
manufacturers of their intellectual property rights to suppress repairs.  As a 
response to these factors and the ever-increasing difficulty in obtaining 
repairs, the repair movement has fought back and lobbied state legislators 
over the past few years for a right to repair. 
C.  Legislation 
Twenty different state legislatures (as of the date of this Article) have 
introduced bills that would provide a right to repair electronic products.  
These states span the United States:  from Hawaii to Washington to the New 
England area, including Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.68  
The legislation introduced in many of these states is based in large part (or in 
whole, in some instances) on the model legislation proposed by the Repair 
Association.69  Although a few state legislatures have edited the model 
legislation to fit certain needs of that particular state—for example, 
California’s 2018 bill was originally proposed to be part of the previously 
enacted Electronic Waste Recycling Act70—the core provisions of the model 
legislation have typically been preserved.71  Therefore, this Article will focus 
on these core provisions. 
 
 67. See generally Ford Glob. Techs., 2018 WL 5786157 (granting Ford’s summary 
judgment motion on the question of infringement of thirteen design patents Ford owned for 
“original equipment designs”). 
 68. The twenty states include:  California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. 
See Press Release, U.S. PIRG, California Becomes 20th State in 2019 to Consider Right to 
Repair Bill (Mar. 18, 2019), https://uspirg.org/news/usp/california-becomes-20th-state-2019-
consider-right-repair-bill [https://perma.cc/GTC5-6NGC]. 
 69. See Advocacy:  Legislation, supra note 16 (crediting current state right to repair 
legislative efforts largely to the influence of the 2012 Massachusetts law); see also Model 
State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21. 
 70. Assemb. 2110, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (as introduced by California Assembly, 
Feb. 8, 2018). 
 71. See About Us:  The Association, supra note 15 (describing the Repair Association’s 
work to introduce pro-repair legislation in several state legislatures). 
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1.  The Model Legislation 
There are four main parts to the model legislation: (1) mandating 
disclosure of information that will allow repairs; (2) mandating the 
availability of parts and tools to facilitate repairs; (3) mandating disclosure 
of information to allow security protections to be reset; and (4) forbidding 
contracting around such provisions in terms between authorized repair 
providers and the original equipment manufacturers.72  Before each part is 
discussed, some definitions in the legislation should be flushed out. 
a.  Definitions and Scope 
The scope of the model law is intended to be broad, and the reach of the 
act is to all “digital electronic equipment,” which is defined as “any product 
that depends for its functioning, in whole or in part, on digital electronics 
embedded in or attached to the product.”73  This definition encompasses 
seemingly every type of product that people use in their daily lives, ranging 
from our coffee machines to cleaning equipment to our cars.  However, the 
model legislation excludes from its ambit “motor vehicles” (as do many of 
the state versions).  In turn, the definition of “motor vehicle” includes those 
types of vehicles that transport “persons or property on a street or highway,” 
but it does not include a motorcycle or a motor home (either an RV or other 
type of motor home).74  This exception may be in recognition of the car 
industry’s nationwide “memorandum of understanding” that deals with a 
consumer’s right to repair motor vehicles.75  Unfortunately, as noted above, 
some motor vehicle manufacturers are finding ways around the agreement 
and the Massachusetts auto repair law.  As such, motor vehicle manufacturers 
may not warrant exclusion from the model legislation.76 
An additional definition that broadens the scope of the model legislation 
is the definition of “owner.”  The model law defines “owner” as anyone who 
purchases or leases digital electronic equipment.77  This is an important 
definition because it would prevent manufacturers from evading the 
legislation by entering lease contracts with customers rather than selling them 
the equipment. 
 
 72. See Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21, § 3. 
 73. Id. § 2(b). 
 74. Id. §§ 2(h), 6. 
 75. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Auto. Aftermarket Indus. Ass’n, Coal. 
for Auto Repair Equal., All. of Auto. Mfrs. & Ass’n of Glob. Automakers (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nastf.org/files/public/OtherReference/MOU_SIGNED_1_15_14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/27YP-7YVJ]. 
 76. See Murphy, supra note 43 (describing the ways in which the car industry is seemingly 
working its way around this agreement and the Massachusetts repair law). 
 77. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21, § 2(m). 
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b.  Mandating Disclosure of Information 
Section 3(a) of the model legislation requires that original equipment 
manufacturers disclose “documentation” that is required to diagnose, 
maintain, or repair digital electronic equipment.78  The documentation must 
be disclosed to either independent repair providers (defined as those who do 
not have any relationship with the manufacturer) or to owners of digital 
electronic equipment.  This documentation is further defined as “any manual, 
diagram, reporting output, service code description, schematic diagram, or 
similar kinds of information.”79 
The idea behind this requirement is that this information is essential in 
order to diagnose, maintain, and repair electronic equipment.  Yet, it can be 
quite difficult to obtain this information, even via reverse engineering.80  
Kyle Wiens, the chief executive officer of iFixit, a repair-related company, 
has made it a mission to obtain this information and has published the results 
of reverse engineering in videos called “teardowns.”81  However, most 
independent repair shops or owners do not have the time or know-how to 
conduct extensive reverse engineering for all products.82  Therefore, 
mandating such disclosure will facilitate more independent repairs. 
c.  Mandating the Availability of Parts and Tools to Facilitate Repairs 
Another aspect that stymies repair of digital electronic equipment is the 
unavailability of tools and parts needed to undertake such repair.  Even if a 
highly motivated owner of such equipment could figure out how to repair her 
broken phone, it is unlikely that she would be able to do so with standard 
home repair tools.83  This is because the parts of some digital equipment are 
either too miniscule to manage with regular tools or because they are simply 
not available for purchase.84  The repair company noted above, iFixit, 
realized that there was a market for tools that could assist in repairing 
electronic equipment.85  It now not only provides the information for 
repairing products but also the means to do so through sales of its specialized 
repair equipment.  Replacement parts, however, are a little trickier because 
 
 78. Id. § 3(a). 
 79. Id. § 2(c). 
 80. See Kyle Wiens, Using Copyright to Keep Repair Manuals Secret Undermines 
Circular Economy, GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2013, 10:09 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
sustainable-business/copyright-law-repair-manuals-circular-economy [https://perma.cc/ 
9TQC-T2X4]. 
 81. Teardowns, IFIXIT, https://www.ifixit.com/Teardown [https://perma.cc/SN95-RN5M] 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 82. About iFixit, IFIXIT, https://www.ifixit.com/Info [https://perma.cc/G692-2C6J] (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 83. See A “Right to Repair” Movement Tools Up, supra note 8. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See David Whitford, Meet the $21 Million Company That Thinks a New iPhone Is a 
Total Waste of Money, INC., https://www.inc.com/magazine/201704/david-whitford/ifixit-
repair-men.html [https://perma.cc/DHU2-B3ZG] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
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their manufacture, sale, and use may infringe upon intellectual property 
rights.86  Considering this, a requirement to make replacement parts available 
is necessary to facilitate repairs. 
d.  Mandating Disclosure of Information to Allow Security Protections to 
Be Reset 
Given that virtually all digital electronic equipment uses some type of 
software, manufacturers’ inclusion of security locks on such software has 
created another problem for repairers.  These “electronic security locks” are 
intended to prevent third parties from accessing the software and are legally 
allowed under the DMCA’s § 1201.87  While these locks are typically 
vulnerable to hacking by those with enough know-how, and hacking is 
widespread, § 1201 further makes it illegal to hack and disseminate the 
knowledge of how to hack around software security protections.88 
Even if hacking is successful, the ability to use the device once the repair 
is made is not guaranteed.  Some manufacturers require the device to confirm 
that the repair was authorized before the software will start again.89  While 
exemptions to § 1201 may allow hacking for purposes of repair, these 
exemptions do not address manufacturers’ additional security measures after 
the repairs are made.90  A requirement that manufacturers provide the 
information necessary to reset the lock is highly imperative considering the 
manufacturers’ efforts to prevent independent repairs. 
e.  Limiting Contracting Around Repair Law 
Finally, section 5 of the model legislation seeks to ensure that 
manufacturers do not attempt to contract around the provisions of the law by 
including terms in their agreements with their authorized repair providers that 
would “purport[] to waive, avoid, restrict, or limit an original equipment 
manufacturer’s obligation to comply with this Act.”91  If the original 
equipment manufacturer attempted to do so, such provision would be “void 
and unenforceable.”92 
 
 86. See infra Part III.  This could actually be the case with respect to repair tools as well. 
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Jason Koebler, In Groundbreaking Decision, Feds Say Hacking DRM to Fix Your 
Electronics Is Legal, VICE:  MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 25, 2018, 12:41 PM), https:// 
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xw9bwd/1201-exemptions-right-to-repair 
[https://perma.cc/NTA5-8R8F] (describing Apple’s “built-in kill switch that can prevent new 
MacBook Pros from functioning if they have been repaired by anyone who is not authorized 
to do so”). 
 90. For example, Apple has begun to require that even after a device is reset and repaired, 
the device must connect with Apple servers to check that the repair was done by an authorized 
vendor. See id. 
 91. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21, § 5(b). 
 92. Id. 
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As discussed above, manufacturers typically maintain an authorized 
network of repair vendors.93  The typical relationship between the 
manufacturer and authorized repair vendor is a contractual one.  Section 5 of 
the model legislation is designed to limit the freedom of contract in this 
context.  If manufacturers were able to contract around the provisions of the 
repair law, they could circumvent the spirit and intent of the law. 
However, this provision is not as broad as it needs to be because it does 
not limit what manufacturers can place in their sales (or lease) contracts with 
their consumers.  Manufacturers are already including limiting provisions in 
contracts with purchasers or lessees of their equipment.94  As will be 
discussed in Part III below, this is an area that is squarely in the mandate of 
the state legislatures to address because contract law is state based.  States 
can declare void any contract terms that would purport to limit repair-related 
activities.  If these types of provisions were included in any enacted state 
repair law, this would go a long way in making a right to repair a reality. 
2.  Why Has the Legislation Stalled? 
Given how large the repair business is for manufacturers, it is not 
surprising that manufacturers would be upset by any attempt to interfere with 
their ability to control the repair market.  Some larger manufacturers have 
been active in attempting to forestall the passage of any right to repair law.95 
In Illinois, for example, the Association of Home Appliance 
Manufacturers rallied Dyson, Wahl, and LG to send similar letters to seven 
members of the Illinois House of Representatives, including the 
representative who introduced the legislation and the Speaker of the House, 
in opposition to a proposed “fair repair” law.96  These letters cited a number 
of different reasons as to why the proposed fair repair law was unwise to 
enact, including concerns regarding quality of repair, consumer safety, 
cybersecurity, and intellectual property.97  Facially, these letters are quite 
persuasive, particularly in their lead arguments regarding consumer and 
product safety.  Given that the legislation is framed as a type of consumer 
protection law, this may seem to make sense.98 
In response to the arguments from manufacturers, members of the repair 
movement cite to consumer autonomy and environmental concerns as 
 
 93. See generally Apple Authorized Service Provider Program, supra note 6. 
 94. See, e.g., Terms & Conditions/Health & Safety Information, SAMSUNG, 
https://www.samsung.com/us/Legal/Phone-HSGuide/ [https://perma.cc/EJ8H-N573] (last 
updated May 9, 2018). 
 95. See Koebler, supra note 45. 
 96. Letter from Jason L. Brown to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from Rick Habben 
to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from John I. Taylor to David Harris, supra note 46. 
 97. Letter from Jason L. Brown to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from Rick Habben 
to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from John I. Taylor to David Harris, supra note 46. 
 98. But see infra Part IV.A (presenting certain counterarguments). 
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rebuttals.99  With respect to consumer autonomy, the main argument is that 
a consumer should have the ability to do what they want with their product 
after purchase.100  As to the substantial e-waste created by products that 
cannot be repaired, the Public Interest Research Group, for instance, reported 
that “New Hampshire throws away 1,500 cell phones every day, and 92 
percent end up in [the] waste stream.”101 
While these and other arguments that the repair movement has offered to 
rebut the concerns expressed by manufacturers have merit, these rebuttals 
have not proven successful.102  In fact, as of the date of this Article, none of 
the twenty states that have pending repair laws have passed their bills.  The 
fight for the right to repair is not over, as some state lawmakers have already 
announced plans to reintroduce failed bills or continue them in their next state 
legislative sessions.103  In addition, the U.S. Copyright Office’s exemptions 
for 2019–2021, which will be discussed below, also provide some 
promise.104  In any event, it seems that the state legislation could use some 
steam.  The way the repair movement has dealt with the manufacturers’ 
arguments on the intellectual property front, in particular, may not have been 
satisfactory.  Paying due attention to intellectual property law is important 
for another reason, as explored in the next section. 
3.  Can State-Based Legislation Be Effectively Implemented? 
Even if the state laws pass, there is a good possibility that states could not 
effectively implement them.  The legislation as currently written is framed in 
consumer protection terms and, on its face, does not account for federal 
intellectual property law.105 
However, the repair model legislation implicates copyright and patent 
laws, both of which are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
 
 99. It’s Time for a Common-Sense Perspective, supra note 19; Repair Revives End-of-Life 
Electronics, REPAIR.ORG, https://repair.org/the-environment [https://perma.cc/FA3B-2J5E] 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 100. See, e.g., Bob Sanders, Heavy Debate Ensues over ‘Right to Repair’ Bill, NH BUS. 
REV. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.nhbr.com/March-2-2018/Heavy-debate-ensues-over-right-
to-repair-bill/ [https://perma.cc/6X2X-2MME]. 
 101. Id. (quoting Nathan Proctor, the director of Public Interest Research Group’s (PIRG) 
right to repair campaign).  As a counter to this, the manufacturers have argued that their 
proprietary software is intended to prevent against overrides that could delete features of 
products that are intended to be environmentally friendly. See id. 
 102. See Abel, supra note 22. 
 103. See iFixit Video, Repair Radio Episode 6:  Right to Repair Chat with Rep. Jeff Morris 
and Kevin Purdy, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=i51YOXCAXJ0 [https://perma.cc/29HR-F73T] (stating that the bill will continue in 
the next session). 
 104. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 105. But see infra Part III.D.2 (discussing trade secrets as an exception to the lack of direct 
engagement with intellectual property). 
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government.106  Under the federal preemption doctrine, in the case of a 
conflict between a state law and a federal law, the federal law controls.107  
Courts typically analyze preemption under the Supremacy Clause of Article 
VI of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States 
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”108  Thus, when a state 
law interferes with the underlying goals of a federal law, it may be struck 
down as preempted.109  Arguably, the proposed model legislation does not 
align with various aspects of intellectual property law.  This may mean that 
state laws based on the model legislation, if enacted, could be subject to 
constitutional challenges in their implementation and enforcement.110  
However, in the past, courts have upheld other state-based legislation that 
similarly attempted to dictate manufacturer actions, even where patent rights 
were implicated.111  For example, the Song-Beverly Act in California 
requires that manufacturers of various types of electronics who have made 
express warranties provide “service literature and functional parts.”112  Thus, 
despite the potential for preemption claims, it is more likely that other 
 
 106. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for copyright); 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for patents). 
 107. See, e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 133, 158 (2018) (“‘Preemption’ generally describes a situation in which federal law 
‘preempts,’ or supersedes, a state or local law.”); Dmitry Karshtedt, Contracting for a Return 
to the USPTO:  Inter Partes Reexaminations as the Exclusive Outlet for Licensee Challenges 
to Patent Validity, 51 IDEA 309, 317 (2011) (noting that under the preemption doctrine “the 
federal law controls and the state law is invalidated” in the case of a conflict between federal 
and state law). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Hrdy, supra note 107, at 158. 
 109. See, e.g., Hrdy, supra note 107, at 158 (noting that “the Federal Circuit currently 
assesses preemption of state anti-patent law by considering whether the challenged state law 
interferes with the underlying goals of the Patent Act and is therefore preempted under the 
Supremacy Clause”).  For other sources discussing preemption and intellectual property laws, 
see generally Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity:  A Study in 
Federal Preemption, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 560 (1993); Roger Ford, The Uneasy Case for 
Patent Federalism, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 551; Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property 
Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 
VA. L. REV. 1579 (2015); Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics 
of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:  The Law 
and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1999); Maureen A. 
O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:  Copyright Preemption 
of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995); Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption 
Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081. 
 110. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 109, at 1607 (discussing the application of the 
preemption doctrine to state anti-troll patent laws). 
 111. In fact, Kali Murray traces how states were historically able to enact state anti-patent 
statutes pursuant to the Tenth Amendment and the states’ “police power” over property and 
contracts. Kali Murray, Constitutional Patent Law:  Principles and Institutions, 93 NEB. L. 
REV. 901, 926–29 (2015). 
 112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.03 (West 2019).  The authors are indebted to Aaron 
Perzanowski for this insight. 
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challenges based on intellectual property laws could be used to prevent 
effective implementation of a right to repair law. 
Before discussing such doctrinal challenges, however, this Article 
engages, first, in an attempt to develop a cohesive theoretical framework for 
justifying a right to repair.  Such a framework bolsters the case for the 
passage of state right to repair laws and also serves as a basis for this Article’s 
proposed revisions of federal intellectual property law as needed to 
effectively implement repair legislation. 
II.  NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A RIGHT TO REPAIR 
The corporations lobbying against the legislation have relied, to a large 
extent, on their intellectual property rights.113  The response of the repair 
advocates has mostly remained on a separate normative level—justifying the 
legislation by resorting to environmental concerns and arguments rooted in 
consumer autonomy and competition—and has not tackled the objections on 
the intellectual property front in a direct manner.114 
This Part presents an analytical framework that justifies a right to repair in 
terms that are reconcilable with intellectual property protection.  Reframing 
and bolstering the arguments for a right to repair in the manner proposed 
herein is likely to reinforce the case for a right to repair, enable a more 
meaningful discussion regarding the potential ways to balance the various 
considerations at stake, and ultimately increase the chances of enacting and 
implementing effective right to repair legislation. 
A.  External Justifications 
Intellectual property protection is not absolute.  The law recognizes that 
intellectual property rights may entail significant costs and come at the 
expense of other valuable social interests.  In response, the law is often 
designed in a manner that attempts to balance the benefits of intellectual 
property rights and other external interests that could be negatively impacted 
if those rights were too strong.115  Each branch of law that deals with a certain 
type of intellectual property right has various mechanisms that aim to achieve 
such a balance.  For instance, the fair use doctrine in copyright law is often 
perceived as a mechanism for balancing copyright protections and free 
speech concerns.116  Similarly, § 287(c) of the Patent Act prevents patent 
 
 113. Letter from Jason L. Brown to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from Rick Habben 
to David Harris, supra note 46; Letter from John I. Taylor to David Harris, supra note 46. 
 114. See supra notes 19, 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 115. Cf. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem:  A User Rights Approach, 
in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 132, 141 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 
2017) (explaining that copyright limitations and exceptions are often conceived as necessary 
to “balance author rights against a public interest”). 
 116. See generally Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as 
a Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31 (2007) 
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owners from suing doctors for infringing medical procedure patents.117  This 
provision, which significantly limits such patents’ effectiveness, is 
commonly justified by the fundamental need to provide patients with access 
to medical treatment.118 
Therefore, even to the extent that the social interests underlying a right to 
repair are external to the values underlying intellectual property rights, this 
does not mean that these interests cannot be accorded significant weight in 
intellectual property policymaking.  Notably, the general values and interests 
highlighted by the repair movement in support of the proposed legislation—
including static efficiency considerations (competition in repair markets), 
environmental concerns, and consumers’ rights in their products—are 
already accommodated in various contexts within intellectual property law’s 
balancing mechanisms.119  In fact, even the need to enable repairs itself has 
been recognized to some extent as an interest worthy of consideration within 
various intellectual property law rules and doctrines.120  Part III will explore 
these areas of the law and examine the need to supplement existing rules and 
doctrines with additional mechanisms to protect and enable a meaningful 
right to repair. 
Thus, just because a certain value or social interest is external to the logic 
and nature of intellectual property rights, this does not mean that such value 
or interest is irrelevant.  Nor, for that matter, is it that such interests must 
always be an afterthought to the protection of intellectual property rights.  
This understanding itself may be helpful in strengthening the case for a right 
to repair against the objections raised on the intellectual property front. 
Yet, it is possible to go one step further.  The next section will demonstrate 
that a right to repair can be justified from an internal perspective as well.  
Though this may seem counterintuitive at first glance, a right to repair could 
 
(providing a critical analysis of the role that the fair use defense purportedly plays as a 
safeguard for protected speech). 
 117. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012). 
 118. For a critical discussion of this provision, see generally Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, 
Patients, and Public Policy:  An Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 601 (2000). 
 119. Static efficiency considerations are reflected in intellectual property law in various 
ways—including, for instance, by limiting the period of exclusivity under various intellectual 
property regimes in order to restore competition in the market once it expires.  Environmental 
concerns are reflected, for instance, in the implementation of measures by various patent 
offices around the world to fast-track green patent applications. See, e.g., Antoine 
Dechezleprêtre & Eric Lane, Fast-Tracking Green Patent Applications, WIPO MAG. (June 
2013), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/03/article_0002.html [https:// 
perma.cc/5894-AAZY] (providing analysis of such programs).  In addition, the Clean Air Act 
employs a mandatory licensing scheme for patented inventions relating to devices for reducing 
air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012).  Finally, the need to accommodate consumers’ 
rights in their products is reflected, for instance, in the patent exhaustion doctrine. See, e.g., 
Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents:  A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 492 (2010) (noting that the “enforcement of . . . resale or use 
restrictions would create an obstacle to the free use and alienability of personal property”). 
 120. See infra Part III. 
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be justified by the very same rationales that have traditionally been used to 
justify intellectual property rights.121  This understanding makes the case for 
carving out a space for a right to repair within intellectual property law even 
more compelling. 
B.  Internal Justifications 
Many theories have been formulated over the years to justify intellectual 
property protection.122  This section will focus primarily on the utilitarian 
theory—the most popular account of intellectual property rights, pursuant to 
which the law should be designed to maximize net social welfare.123  As 
explored below, a strong case for a right to repair can be made under this 
approach.  Conducting the theoretical analysis with the lens of the utilitarian 
theory of intellectual property is particularly beneficial as the arguments 
raised by opponents of the state legislation are framed in utilitarian terms as 
well.  The centrality of the utilitarian argument to this Article’s thesis 
notwithstanding, this Article also briefly discusses the possibility of 
justifying a right to repair under other theories commonly used in discussions 
of intellectual property law:  the labor theory, the personality theory, and the 
social planning theory.124 
1.  Utilitarianism 
The primary utilitarian justification for the patent and copyright systems 
focuses on their role in promoting progress by providing an incentive for the 
development of technological inventions and the creation of original works 
of authorship.125  This notion is embedded in the U.S. Constitution, which 
 
 121. Cf. Guy Pessach, Toward a New Jurisprudence of Copyright Exemptions, 55 IDEA 
287, 293 (2015) (suggesting that “the justifications for structuring copyright’s exemptions as 
exclusion rights, mirror economic justifications for copyright protection”). 
 122. See generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
 123. See, e.g., id.;  see also Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2257, 2275 (2010) (noting the scholarly convention that the utilitarian theory is the 
prominent justification for intellectual property rights in the United States). 
 124. By choosing to focus on the utilitarian approach, we do not mean to imply that 
utilitarianism is a descriptively or normatively satisfactory account of intellectual property 
law.  In fact, both authors have expressed in various contexts criticism of the utilitarian account 
of intellectual property. See, e.g., Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory:  The 
Chinese Trademark Law, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 53 (2008); Ofer Tur-Sinai, 
Beyond Incentives:  Expanding the Theoretical Framework for Patent Law Analysis, 45 
AKRON L. REV. 243 (2012) [hereinafter Tur-Sinai, Theoretical Framework]; Ofer Tur-Sinai, 
Technological Progress and Well-Being, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145 (2016) [hereinafter Tur-
Sinai, Technological Progress]. 
 125. For sources noting the utilitarian nature of the patent system, see, for example, Dan L. 
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597 (2003); 
Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District:  Observations on the Grady-Alexander 
Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 359 (1992); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair 
Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181–82 (2000); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do 
Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 554 (2012).  For the 
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empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (“IP Clause”).126  As the 
analysis below will show, designing intellectual property law in a manner 
that accommodates the concept of a right to repair and balances the exclusive 
rights granted to intellectual property owners with the right to repair could 
promote “Progress” in three interrelated ways:  (1) as an essential component 
of the “Progress of Science and useful Arts” that Congress is mandated to 
promote under the Constitution; (2) as necessary to enable user innovation; 
and (3) as a mechanism that enhances the flow of information about 
technological innovation to the public. 
a.  Advancement of Progress 
Under a utilitarian worldview, the state’s ultimate goal is to enhance 
human well-being in society.127  To promote this goal in the context of the 
IP Clause, the state needs to not only ensure the development of products and 
services but also to promote their commercialization and broad diffusion.  To 
the extent that consumers are not getting a chance to access and benefit from 
such products or services, their impact on human welfare is not fully 
realized.128  As highlighted by Professor Gaia Bernstein, “[a]ttaining the 
progress objective requires not just innovation but also an adoption process.  
Progress can be attained only if people adopt and use the new technology.”129  
Indeed, this notion is reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s intellectual 
 
dominance of the utilitarian justification for copyright law, see, for example, Jeanne C. 
Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 73 (2014).  Notably, the 
utilitarian justification for trademark law is different and focuses on the role of trademarks in 
reducing consumers’ search costs and in incentivizing businesses to produce consistently high-
quality goods and services. See generally Fisher, supra note 122.  See also supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 127. For the link between utilitarianism and the maximization of social welfare, see 
Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 37 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 253, 255–56 (2008) (discussing the moral framework of utilitarianism); William W. 
Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare:  Developing Drugs for the Developing 
World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 602 (2007) (noting how utilitarianism “urges lawmakers 
to choose the course of action that is most likely to produce the highest net social welfare”).  
For a discussion of the criterion of well-being that the state should adopt in the context of 
innovation law and policy, see generally Tur-Sinai, Technological Progress, supra note 124. 
 128. Indeed, some scholars have emphasized the role of both patent and copyright law in 
incentivizing the commercialization of new products and works, and not just their initial 
creation. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 736 (2001) (suggesting a justification for the patent system, 
which is based on the need to provide “incentive to commercialize” the invention); Adam 
Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation:  A Case Study of Scholarly Publishing in the 
Digital World, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955 (illuminating the importance of copyright in 
incentivizing intermediaries to invest in and create distribution mechanisms for copyrighted 
works). 
 129. See Bernstein, supra note 123, at 2259. 
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property jurisprudence.  In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,130 for instance, 
the Court explained that patent laws promote progress by incentivizing 
inventors to make a productive effort that will ultimately “have a positive 
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of 
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased 
employment and better lives for our citizens.”131  Thus, even under a 
traditional view of the IP Clause, there is a justification for a right to repair 
as a measure enhancing consumers’ ability to benefit from the innovative 
products brought about by technological progress. 
Yet, once the traditionally narrow and simplistic perception of progress is 
replaced with a more holistic one, the justification for a right to repair as an 
essential component of a balanced intellectual property regime can be 
bolstered even further.  The term “Progress” in the IP Clause is traditionally 
conceived as representing a modernist perception, under which constant 
innovation and creation are regarded as necessary to maintain perpetual 
growth and satisfy consumers’ demand for new products and services.132  
Such a concept of progress represents political ideologies of economic 
liberalism, capitalism, and consumerism.133  But in recent years, various 
intellectual property scholars have challenged this simplistic account of 
progress and proposed alternate constructions of this term that are broader 
and more holistic.134 
Professor Margaret Chon, for example, rejects the view of progress as a 
“liberating upward trajectory” and advances a postmodern view of progress, 
which incorporates “ecologically-based limits to economic growth, as well 
as the need for the redistribution of existing material wealth within present 
and between present and future generations.”135  Chon posits that “the 
incentives provided by copyrights and patents are only second-order 
concerns which serve a higher purpose—the ‘Progress’ project—which 
preserves and nurtures a commons of knowledge.”136  Ultimately, Professor 
 
 130. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 131. Id. at 480. 
 132. See Tur-Sinai, Technological Progress, supra note 124, at 147. 
 133. Id. 
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infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 135. Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”:  Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent 
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intellectual property policymaking and scholarship, see, for example, Estelle Derclaye, 
Eudemonic Intellectual Property:  Patents and Related Rights as Engines of Happiness, 
Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 495, 508–19 (2012) (arguing that the 
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1197, 1207 (2013) (criticizing the measuring of societal progress by technological 
advancement and economic growth while failing to adequately balance “other equally 
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Chon maintains that “[a]n idea of progress that rejects sheer material growth 
as its sine qua non changes the focus of our intellectual property laws from 
competition policy to the complicated interface between science and 
society.”137  Similarly, Professors Brett Frischmann and Mark McKenna 
argue that “the IP Clause leaves open a number of ways to conceive of 
Progress,”138 in support of their claim that a normative commitment to 
intergenerational justice is compatible with the IP Clause.139 
This Article shares with these scholars the principal view that the 
constitutional mandate to promote “the Progress of the Science and useful 
Arts” should not be reduced to enabling market incentives to drive 
technological innovation and artistic creation.  Furthermore, not only should 
“Progress” be construed in a broader, more holistic way but it should also be 
interpreted in a dynamic manner.  The notion of “Progress” envisioned by 
the framers of the Constitution in the eighteenth century is not necessarily 
equal to the type of “Progress” that would benefit society in the twenty-first 
century.  Notably, as the world is facing a potential major environmental 
crisis due to climate change,140 intellectual property laws should be applied 
in a way that is consistent with and sensitive to environmental outcomes.141 
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Once we embrace a broader and more dynamic construction of the term 
“Progress” and a correspondingly broader reading of the IP Clause, it is easy 
to justify a right to repair as a notion that is at least compatible with the 
rationales underlying intellectual property law.  Such a right is likely to 
enable consumers to enjoy goods and services in a fuller and more 
meaningful way, which entails more autonomy and involves less dependency 
upon the original suppliers of such goods and services.  Consumers’ 
enjoyment of the relevant products could also be expected to last for longer 
periods, assuming that more consumers will choose to repair their products 
under a regime of competition in repair markets than when these markets are 
controlled by original manufacturers.142  Altogether, with a right to repair in 
place, consumers are likely to derive more utility from their consumption of 
technological goods—what ultimately serves the underlying utilitarian goal 
of enhancing overall well-being.143  In addition, a legal regime enabling 
repairs could have a positive impact on the natural environment that certainly 
aligns with a more holistic concept of “Progress.”144 
Many of the arguments noted above have been brought up by the right to 
repair advocates in support of the legislation.  What has been missing is the 
link to intellectual property law.  As demonstrated, such arguments can serve 
as the basis for an internal justification of the right to repair—one that views 
such a right as a vital component of an intellectual property regime that aims 
to promote “Progress.” 
b.  Enabling User Innovation 
Even under a narrower concept of “Progress” that focuses on the need to 
incentivize the development of novel technological products and the creation 
of original works of authorship, a right to repair can still be justified as 
necessary to facilitate and encourage user innovation.  As demonstrated in 
the work of Professor Eric von Hippel and others, “users of products and 
services—both firms and individual consumers . . . are increasingly able to 
innovate for themselves.”145  Indeed, in today’s innovation landscape, 
 
301 (2011); Ofer Tur-Sinai, Patents and Climate Change:  A Skeptic’s View, 48 ENVTL. L. 211 
(2018). 
 142. See, e.g., Mostafa Sabbaghi et al., The Current Status of Consumer Electronics Repair 
Industry in the U.S.:  A Survey-Based Study, RESOURCES, CONSERVATION & RECYCLING, Jan. 
2017, at 137, 143–44 (discussing price sensitivity of consumers and repair). 
 143. Interestingly, recent studies in the field of psychology point to the relation between a 
“maker identity” (i.e., being involved in do-it-yourself activities) and subjective well-being. 
See, e.g., Ann F. Collier & Heidi A. Wayment, Psychological Benefits of the “Maker” or Do-
It-Yourself Movement in Young Adults:  A Pathway Towards Subjective Well-Being, 19 J. 
HAPPINESS STUD. 1217 (2018).  Inasmuch as this is true, it adds another layer of support to 
the argument that having a right to repair may enhance the value that consumers derive from 
their products. 
 144. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 145. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005).  For a list of examples of 
user innovation, see Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators:  Implications for Patent 
Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 468–69 (2008). 
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innovation in many technological fields is often originated from users of 
technology who develop new products and services to satisfy their own 
needs, rather than to sell them.146  While this is beneficial to the individuals 
engaging in the practice of innovation, such innovative activity can also yield 
significant benefits to society.147  The innovations created often spread to 
peers and to commercial firms that may adopt them as the basis for valuable 
market products.148 
Yet, in order to enable and encourage user innovation, the intellectual 
property system must preserve a space for users to tinker, experiment, and 
otherwise engage with their products in various ways.149  In this vein, users 
should also be free to engage in repairs of technological products without 
fear of infringement liability.150  A right to repair, in other words, is an 
essential component of a legal environment conducive to user innovation. 
More concretely, while repairing a product, a user could come up with 
ideas for improvements, variations, or spin-offs of the same product or be 
inspired to design something new.  One famous example for an innovation 
born out of repair is the first operative airplane built by the Wright brothers 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.151  The brothers, working alone 
from their bicycle repair shop, solved the problem of “controlled flight” that 
had occupied the minds of many engineers throughout the years.152  The 
solution was found while Wilbur, one of the brothers, was toying in their 
store with a rectangular bicycle inner-tube box.153  Wilbur concluded that 
“by connecting the motion of a flying machine’s wings in relation to one 
another, twisting the axis of the wings in the same way a box twists,” a pilot 
could control the aircraft.154  This led to the successful development of the 
first airplane and is considered a foundation to modern-day aeronautics.155 
In addition to innovations related to the product itself, opening repair 
markets for competition could also increase innovation in the repair industry.  
Consumers and independent repair shops might come up with new methods 
 
 146. See Strandburg, supra note 145, at 469.  For other prominent works exploring user 
innovation, see generally VON HIPPEL, supra note 145; William W. Fisher III, The Implications 
for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010); Samuelson, supra note 31; 
Andrew W. Torrance & Eric von Hippel, The Right to Innovate, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793. 
 147. See Strandburg, supra note 145, at 469. 
 148. Id. 
 149. For the importance of the right to tinker, see generally Samuelson, supra note 31. 
 150. With respect to the link between repair and user innovation, see Strandburg, supra 
note 145, at 494–95. 
 151. See Katherine White, What If Bicycles Held the Secret to Human Flight?, HENRY 
FORD, https://www.thehenryford.org/explore/stories-of-innovation/what-if/wright-brothers/ 
[https://perma.cc/URE5-2NNF] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019); see also Brittany McCrigler, The 
Wright Way:  Repair Teaches Engineering, IFIXIT (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.ifixit.com/ 
News/the-wright-way-to-teach-engineering [https://perma.cc/4H77-J3UW]. 
 152. White, supra note 151. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., id.; see also McCrigler, supra note 151 (noting other “bike repair concepts” 
that are mirrored in the airplane built by the Wright brothers). 
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of repair, develop or improve repair tools, and create user-generated tips, 
manuals, and kits that could significantly benefit others.156  More generally, 
repairing a product requires observation and the acquisition of knowledge.  
Thus, while engaging in repair, users are likely to increase their technological 
savviness and mechanical skills and acquire knowledge and tools that could 
prove helpful at a later point as they come across an opportunity to be 
involved in an innovative endeavor.157 
To conclude, a right to repair can directly lead to further innovation and, 
thus, can be justified from the perspective of dynamic efficiency underlying 
intellectual property laws.  Once again, the justification for a right to repair 
can be predicated on the same rationales that are normally used to justify the 
exclusive rights of intellectual property owners. 
c.  Promotion of Information Disclosure 
A third way by which a right to repair fits in the utilitarian justification for 
intellectual property rights has to do with the disclosure function of patents.  
One of the economic justifications of patent law under the utilitarian 
overarching framework is the “incentive to disclose” theory.158  Under this 
theory, patents contribute to progress by incentivizing disclosure of 
information that would have otherwise remained secret.  This theory is often 
framed in terms of a “bargain” between the inventor and the state.159  To 
enjoy the period of exclusivity offered by the state, the inventor must disclose 
certain information related to her invention that ultimately becomes part of 
 
 156. For examples of repair tools and manuals, see IFIXIT, https://www.ifixit.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/92AF-3WY9] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 157. Consider, again, the Wright brothers, whose innovative techniques in engineering are 
commonly attributed to their hands-on experience in repair. 
 158. For sources describing the incentive to disclose theory, see, for example, Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028–29 (1989); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 632 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003); 
Ouellette, supra note 125, at 571–81; Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner:  
Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 189–90 (1998). 
 159. The notion of the “patent bargain” refers to the “bilateral relationship between the 
inventor and the state, under whose terms the inventor must disclose in exchange for protection 
of a property right in the invention.” Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:  
Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1338 
(2004); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 553 (2009) (“The 
accepted understanding in patent policy and doctrine is that disclosure of a patented invention 
to the public—and its dedication to the public after the expiration of the patent term—is part 
of a quid pro quo the patentee must provide to gain the broad patent right.”); Gordon, supra 
note 158, at 632 (discussing the notion of patent as a “bargain”:  “the government gives the 
possibility of exclusivity and in exchange the patent applicant gives disclosure”).  In the 
Supreme Court’s words, “the quid pro quo [for the patent grant] is disclosure of a process or 
device in sufficient detail to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention once 
the period of the monopoly has expired.” Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining 
Co., 322 U.S. 472, 484 (1944). 
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the public domain.160  As stated by the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp.: 
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated 
to the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions 
to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal 
that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of 
exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will 
stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant 
advances in the art.161 
The current disclosure obligations do not mandate a patent applicant to 
disclose information that would enable repair of a patented product but only 
“the manner and process of making and using the invention.”162  Arguably, 
to use the invention meaningfully, a user must have information that would 
enable repairs if needed.  Yet the statutory disclosure obligations have never 
been construed as encompassing a duty to supply repair information. 
Regardless, looking at a right to repair from the perspective of the 
“incentive to disclose” theory highlights another way that repairs may 
promote “Progress.”  Enabling the repair of a patented product by consumers 
and independent repair shops may result in a wider diffusion of knowledge 
about the technological features of the invention embedded in said product.  
Thus, a right to repair could complement the existing patent disclosure 
requirements in facilitating a flow of information regarding technological 
innovation to the public.  To better serve this aim, repairers should also be 
allowed to disseminate repair information publicly through manuals, do-it-
yourself videos, etc.  Notably, repair information that is supplied by 
manufacturers or independently uncovered by users would remain accessible 
to the public even if the intellectual property owner ceases production and 
distribution of the product and stops offering repair services with respect 
thereto.163  Continuous availability of such information could be important 
 
 160. As part of the disclosure requirement, the inventor must adequately disclose three 
separate elements:  (1) enough information to indicate that the inventor is in possession of the 
claimed invention (the “written description” requirement), (2) the manner and process of 
making and using the invention, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same (the “enablement” requirement), and (3) the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention (the “best mode” requirement). 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); 
see also 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 7–9 (2019); Fromer, supra note 159, 
at 546. 
 161. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
 162. See Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 163. Cf. Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 
2014 BYU L. REV. 55, 111 (maintaining that enabling works to remain accessible to the public 
is one of the benefits of the first sale doctrine in copyright law). 
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not only from the narrow perspective of the ability to repair the specific 
product but also as a stimulant for follow-on innovation.164 
2.  Nonutilitarian Justifications 
In addition to the utilitarian justification, a right to repair can be justified 
from the perspective of certain nonutilitarian theories that have often been 
used in theoretical discussions of intellectual property law:  labor theory; 
personality theory; and social planning theory.  The next paragraphs will 
briefly survey these theories and the potential insights that can be drawn from 
them with respect to the justifications for a right to repair. 
a.  Labor Theory 
The labor theory, based on the work of John Locke,165 is one of the 
principal theories used to justify property rights in general166 and intellectual 
property rights in particular.167  Under the labor theory, the right of every 
person to the fruits of her labor is limited by two provisos:  (1) “there is 
enough, and as good, left in common for others”;168 and (2) the laborer does 
not waste resources by taking more than she needs for her own use, including 
use by means of exchange with others.169 
Using intellectual property rights to block consumers from repairing their 
own products and to secure control over the repair industry does not align 
with these provisos.170  Generally speaking, the broader the scope of 
intellectual property rights, and the more control their owners are given over 
secondary markets—the narrower the opportunities are of others to labor and 
earn sustenance, contrary to the first proviso.171  As to the second proviso, a 
legal regime that does not allow for independent repairs of consumer 
 
 164. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 481 (“[D]isclosure . . . will stimulate ideas and the 
eventual development of further significant advances in the art.”). 
 165. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 100 (Ian Shapiro ed., 
2003). 
 166. See, e.g., J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 182–212 (1996); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, 
A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254–91 (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
19 (1988). 
 167. See generally, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1993); Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke:  A Natural Law 
Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, A 
Property Right in Self-Expression:  Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Tur-Sinai, Theoretical Framework, supra note 
124. 
 168. LOCKE, supra note 165, at 112–13. 
 169. Id. at 121. 
 170. See also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski:  History and 
Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 85–88 (2011) (discussing Locke’s proviso in the context of 
subject matter eligibility). 
 171. Damstedt, supra note 167, at 1187. 
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products would most certainly result in waste if consumers chose not to repair 
their products and instead bought new ones.  In such a case, the social value 
of the product is not fully realized.  Therefore, a right to repair consumer 
products may be a critical component of an intellectual property system under 
the labor theory. 
b.  Personality Theory 
The right to repair can also be justified under the personality theory of 
property, which is based on Hegel’s work.172  According to the personality 
theory, private property is necessary as a means for developing and realizing 
one’s personality.173  Under Hegel’s theory, a person cannot begin to realize 
her self-identity until she is given an opportunity to exercise her will on 
external objects in her surroundings.174  For a person to enjoy freedom of 
action with respect to assets and a sense of security with respect to the 
continuity of her relationship with them and be able to uniquely identify 
herself based on her relationship with such assets, she should be provided a 
certain level of control over the assets—which is the reason that the 
institution of private property is necessary.175  The personality theory has 
been used to justify rights in tangible property as well as in intellectual 
property.176 
Entrusting control over repair of consumer products to original 
manufacturers denies consumers an important aspect of product ownership—
the ability to control the “destiny” of their own property and to decide how 
to handle it when it is malfunctioning.  These aspects could be essential for a 
consumer’s ability to preserve a sense of autonomy and realize their self-
identity under the personality theory.177  In addition, consumers who choose 
to repair their products on their own could benefit from “exercise of 
competence, meaningful engagement, and self-expression.”178  At the same 
 
 172. See generally G. W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S. W. Dyde trans., Dover 
Philosophical Classics 2005) (1821). 
 173. Id. 
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 175. Id.; see also Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of 
Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 934, 948 (2007); Hughes, supra note 167, 
at 330; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 972 (1982).  
Notably, the trend toward licensing, leasing, and other business models that do not provide 
individuals with full ownership of products they use undermines their ability to develop their 
personality in this manner. See generally AARON PERZANOWKSI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END 
OF OWNERSHIP:  PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016).  The authors are 
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 176. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 167; Hughes, supra note 167; Tur-Sinai, Theoretical 
Framework, supra note 124. 
 177. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 31, at 565 (noting the “intellectual privacy and 
autonomy interest” in investigating and exploring consumer products as an essential feature 
of the “freedom to tinker” which the author advocates). 
 178. See generally Andrew Torrance & Eric von Hippel, Protecting the Right to Innovate:  
Our Innovation “Wetlands,” in THE NEW PRODUCTION OF USERS:  CHANGING INNOVATION 
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time, carving out a space for a right to repair consumer products does not 
seem to harm the personality interests of owners of intellectual property 
rights that are embodied in such products.  In fact, when the owner of the 
rights is a corporation rather than a private individual, the personality interest 
is largely irrelevant.179  For all of these reasons, the personality theory can 
also bolster the arguments in favor of a right to repair. 
c.  Social Planning Theory 
Another theoretical justification for intellectual property law is the “social 
planning theory.”180  As described by Professor William Fisher, who coined 
this term, this approach is rooted in the proposition that the law “can and 
should be shaped so as to help foster the achievement of a just and attractive 
culture.”181  “Social justice” is another related concept that is used by 
scholars who view intellectual property law as a mechanism for social 
engineering.182  Surely, there is a need to agree on a particular vision of a just 
society that needs to be promoted.  The concepts of distributive justice183 and 
 
COLLECTIVES AND INVOLVEMENT STRATEGIES 45 (Sampsa Hyysalo et al. eds., 2016) (noting 
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 179. For discussion, see Tur-Sinai, Theoretical Framework, supra note 124, at 285; see 
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INNOVATION IN EVOLVING ECONOMIES:  THE ROLE OF LAW 78 (Megan M. Carpenter ed., 2012); 
Lateef Mtima, Copyright Social Utility and Social Justice Interdependence:  A Paradigm for 
Intellectual Property Empowerment and Digital Entrepreneurship, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 97 
(2009). 
 183. See generally KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS:  CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT 
GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2008); Fisher, supra note 122 (listing 
distributive justice as one of the features of a just and attractive culture); Mtima, supra note 
182 (discussing the use of intellectual property law as an engine for the socioeconomic 
advancement of marginalized communities); Haochen Sun, Can Louis Vuitton Dance with 
HiPhone?:  Rethinking the Idea of Social Justice in Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 389 (2012); see also ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 102–36 (2011) (demonstrating how intellectual property law embodies distributive 
justice considerations); Sunder, supra note 181, at 264 (integrating concerns for distributive 
justice as part of his “cultural analysis of intellectual property” theory). 
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a need to balance between competing stakeholders are often raised in this 
context.184 
It is easy to understand how a right to repair could be justified from the 
perspective of social planning theory.  Such a right could advance the 
position of individual consumers vis-à-vis original manufacturers of 
consumer goods.  The more competitive the repair market, the easier it would 
be for consumers to obtain inexpensive and accessible repairs.  In some cases, 
this may result in a consumer’s decision to keep a repaired product rather 
than throw it away and buy a new one.  Keeping their products functioning 
longer may be economically significant for consumers; technologically 
complex products are generally more expensive to replace.  For example, 
fixing a smartphone may cost around $200, whereas buying a new 
smartphone may cost upwards of $550.185  Thus, by recognizing the 
legitimate interests of consumers in accessing a well-functioning repair 
market for their products, a right to repair could advance greater 
socioeconomic equality.  At the same time, enabling the owners of 
independent repair shops to keep their jobs is also a step towards a more just 
society.  Beyond the economic savings, a legal regime that enables and 
encourages independent repairs is likely to increase consumers’ sense of 
autonomy while decreasing their dependency on original manufacturers.  
Finally, a culture that encourages repairs of broken products is certainly more 
attractive than one where people are tempted to throw away their products 
and replace them, particularly in light of the current environmental concerns. 
C.  Summary 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that a right to repair is supported 
both by external considerations and internal justifications underpinning 
intellectual property law.  In essence, the right to repair could be conceived 
as necessary to enable intellectual property law to achieve its prescribed 
goals. 
Notably, many of the justifications raised by advocates of the right to 
repair legislation (and presented originally as external justifications) can be 
integrated within, and presented as components of, the internal justifications 
 
 184. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 
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as well.  The discussion above has illustrated, for example, that enabling 
repairs of protected products in an effort to minimize waste could be viewed 
as a vital component of an intellectual property regime that is designed to 
promote “Progress.”186  In addition, for similar reasons, repairs are a 
necessary exception to the scope of intellectual property protection under the 
labor theory.187  As another example, considerations related to consumer 
autonomy and the need to respect consumers’ property rights are integral to 
the analysis under the personality theory.188 
Tying these seemingly external justifications with the fundamental notions 
underlying intellectual property law highlights the importance of 
acknowledging, and carving out a space for, a right to repair within 
intellectual property law.  However, as justified as a right to repair may be, 
it is important to ensure that its implementation would not weaken 
intellectual property protection to a suboptimal level. 
Taking control of the repair business out of the hands of manufacturers 
will undoubtedly affect their profits.  For the most part, this should not 
undercut the ability of intellectual property systems to achieve their 
prescribed policy goals.189  Yet, adequate balancing between the 
considerations at stake is more nuanced and context dependent.  For instance, 
one relevant consideration that may impact the proper balancing is whether 
any duty is imposed on the manufacturers (i.e., a duty not to interfere with a 
right to repair or an even more active duty) or we are merely dealing with a 
consumer’s privilege.  This and other considerations will guide us in Part III 
where we take a close look at intellectual property law and analyze the extent 
to which it is compatible with a right to repair.  Such an exploration is 
necessary to ensure that once a right to repair is established, manufacturers 
could not use their intellectual property rights to undercut consumers’ ability 
to effectively exercise such right.  While exploring the different branches of 
intellectual property law, Part III identifies certain rules and doctrines that 
already accommodate, to some extent, the need for a right to repair and 
examine whether such rules and doctrines satisfactorily balance the 
considerations at stake.  In contexts where current doctrine does not 
sufficiently take into account the need to enable repairs, we will evaluate the 
possibility of construing or amending the law to better accommodate this 
need. 
III.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RAMIFICATIONS FOR A RIGHT TO REPAIR 
To account for the factors noted above in Part II and other relevant policy 
considerations, the discussion in Part III will frame the right to repair as 
 
 186. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
 187. See supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
 189. See infra Part IV.B. 
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encompassing four different concentric circles.190  The analysis will first 
discuss the core aspect of a right to repair:  the right of individual consumers 
to engage in the activity of repairing their own products.  It will then move 
to outer circles.  The second circle represents the ability to engage in other 
activities that facilitate repairs, including diffusion of repair information and 
advertising repair businesses.  The next circle contains the freedom to 
manufacture, import, sell, and use replacement parts.  The final outer circle 
encompasses the right to mandate original manufacturers to disclose repair 
information and supply replacement parts. 
This Article’s proposals regarding the narrower circles may be perceived 
as more modest and be more politically feasible than the ones portrayed in 
the outer circles.  Thus, holding the discussion in such a modular manner 
accommodates the possibility that some readers might support the arguments 
made in connection to inner circles, even if they are not persuaded by this 
Article’s recommendations with respect to outer ones. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 190. While we find this division into four different layers useful in illuminating certain 
common characteristics of different activities taken in the context of repair, this Article’s 
recommendations are not dependent on it. 
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A.  Repair by Individual Consumers 
At the very core of the right to repair is a right of individual consumers to 
engage in repair activities.  In this context, all the justifications underlying a 
right to repair are directly applicable, including the need to preserve 
consumer autonomy and the potential contribution of independent repair 
activity to “Progress” in the different manners explored above.  At the same 
time, enabling repair by consumers does not require the original 
manufacturers to do much.  In this sense, it might be tempting to characterize 
the nature of consumers’ legal entitlement to repair as a “privilege,” in the 
Hohfeldian sense of the term, rather than a right.191  Yet, the term “right” 
seems to be more accurate, even with respect to this core layer.  For the 
consumers’ entitlement to repair to be meaningful, it must be correlated with 
a duty of the original manufacturers to not interfere with the exercise of the 
right (for instance, by way of enforcing intellectual property rights against 
individual consumers who repair their own products).192 
Within this core layer, manufacturers are under no duty to take any 
affirmative actions to facilitate repairs.  This, coupled with the importance of 
enabling the core activities, makes balancing manufacturers’ interests and 
consumers’ interests in this context clearly in favor of repair.  Furthermore, 
enabling repairs does not negatively impact the primary market for any 
protected invention embodied in the product, which was already sold once, 
presumably by or under the authorization of the manufacturer.  Thus, 
measures to secure this layer of the right to repair can be implemented 
without fear of reducing intellectual property incentives to a suboptimal 
level.193 
The proposed model legislation does not deal with this core layer of the 
right to repair at all, although it should not be taken for granted.  As the 
following analysis demonstrates, repairing a product may implicate patent 
and copyright law issues.194  While it is unclear to what extent manufacturers 
 
 191. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
 192. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing copyright law and 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012)). 
 193. See infra Part IV.B. 
 194. Notably, neither trademark law nor trade secret law is seemingly implicated by this 
layer and therefore not addressed in this section.  Trademark law requires that the original 
trademark be “used in commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).  Where the owner of the product 
makes the repairs herself, courts have held that there has been no use in commerce and, 
therefore, trademark law is not brought into question. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. 
Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We do, however, recognize the right 
of property owners to repair or alter trademarked goods without implicating the Lanham Act.  
For example, if the owner chooses to buy aftermarket spare parts and do the repairs himself, 
there is no sale of a trademarked good in commerce, and hence no trademark infringement.”).  
Similarly, trade secret law is not implicated in this scenario—assuming that the owner of a 
product is utilizing information and know-how that is publicly available or she is able to obtain 
herself through reverse-engineering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012). 
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would take action against individual consumers, the fact that consumers are 
exposed to potential legal liability is still problematic.195  Therefore, there is 
a need to examine how intellectual property law may stymie consumer 
freedom and how courts or legislation could resolve this issue. 
1.  Repairing Patented Products 
a.  Exhaustion and the Repair-Reconstruction Dichotomy 
Under § 271 of the Patent Act, “whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent 
therefor, infringes the patent.”196  Repairing a patented product entails a use 
of the invention and, therefore, counts as patent infringement unless 
otherwise permitted.197 
Fortunately, patent law recognizes a right to repair to a considerable 
extent.198  Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, an authorized sale of a 
patented item exhausts the patentee’s rights with respect to that item and 
leaves the purchaser and subsequent owners free to use or resell it without 
fear of an infringement lawsuit.199  As part of the “use” of the product, its 
owner can repair it, if necessary.  Yet, courts have drawn a distinction 
between repair and reconstruction.  While repair is permissible, the 
reconstruction of a patented product amounts to the making of a new article 
and thus constitutes patent infringement.200  Courts have struggled in 
drawing the line between repair and reconstruction.201 
 
 195. Informal demand letters are used to intimidate individuals and create a “chilling 
effect.” See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 411 (2015) (discussing how cease-and-desist letters are used to intimidate individuals 
and small entities into acceding to intellectual property rights demands made by larger 
entities). 
 196. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 197. This is true with respect to both a utility patent and a design patent. Id. 
 198. In addition to the right to repair that exists due to the exhaustion doctrine discussed 
below, another possibility to shield repair activity from a patent owner’s control could be to 
classify the invention’s use as private and noncommercial.  But the United States, unlike other 
countries, does not have a “private use” exception to patent infringement—so this is not a 
realistic possibility. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller 
and User Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that 
U.S. patent law is “inconsistent with the practice in some other countries, which exempts from 
liability the private, noncommercial use of patented inventions”). 
 199. See, e.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017); 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 283 (2013); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 
553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008). 
 200. For a leading case, see Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 
336 (1961). 
 201. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“Although the rule is straightforward its implementation is less so, for it is not always clear 
where the boundary lies:  how much ‘repair’ is fair before the device is deemed 
reconstructed.”); Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe:  Repair, Reconstruction and 
the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 425 (1999) (“The 
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Given the gray line between what is considered a repair versus 
reconstruction, consumers’ ability to operate freely has been limited.  But as 
the line between repair and reconstruction is a judicially constructed one, 
recognizing the strong justifications for a right to repair can lead to a shift in 
the way this line is drawn.  In doing so, courts could ultimately classify more 
uses as permissible repairs rather than as “reconstruction,” which would 
provide consumers more freedom in repairing their products. 
b.  Post-Sale Contractual Restrictions 
But what if the patent owner prohibits independent repairs as part of the 
sale or license agreement with the consumer?  The Samsung Galaxy 
smartphone’s terms and conditions contain an example of a contract 
provision that could be construed as prohibiting repairs:  “[a]ny changes or 
modifications to your mobile device not expressly approved by Samsung 
could void your warranty for this equipment and void your authority to 
operate this equipment.”202  Similarly, farm equipment sold by John Deere 
is accompanied by a license agreement that prevents consumers from 
accessing the software embedded in the equipment and prohibits any repairs 
other than those made by an authorized repair provider.203 
For many years, the Federal Circuit treated exhaustion as a default rule that 
may be contracted around, which enabled patent owners to enforce post-sale 
restrictions through patent infringement lawsuits.204  However, the Supreme 
Court held in its recent landmark decision Impression Products, Inc. v. 
Lexmark International, Inc.205 that an authorized sale of a patented item 
exhausts all patent rights with respect to that item, regardless of any 
restrictions on use that the patentee purports to impose.206  In other words, 
violations of such restrictions no longer have remedies in patent law.207 
Nevertheless, the Court in Impression Products did not rule out the 
possibility that the patent owner could enforce post-sale restrictions 
(including non-repair clauses) under contract law in state court.208  An action 
for a breach of contract is surely not as effective or as rewarding as a patent 
 
repair-reconstruction dichotomy has baffled and annoyed courts for decades, often driving 
courts to employ ‘loose language.’”). 
 202. Terms & Conditions/Health & Safety Information, supra note 94. 
 203. See Jason Bloomberg, John Deere’s Digital Transformation Runs Afoul of Right-to-
Repair Movement, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/ 
2017/04/30/john-deeres-digital-transformation-runs-afoul-of-right-to-repair-movement/ 
[https://perma.cc/2Q93-AUQQ]. 
 204. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701 (“Use in violation of a valid restriction may be 
remedied under the patent law, provided that no other law prevents enforcement of the 
patent.”). 
 205. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
 206. Id. at 1532–33. 
 207. See Rinehart, supra note 119, at 486. 
 208. See Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1335. 
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infringement lawsuit.209  Still, the possibility of being sued may deter 
consumers and repair businesses from exercising their right to repair.  Thus, 
it is important to find ways to decrease this concern.210 
One possible way to deal with this is to look to certain contract law 
doctrines to strike down post-sale restrictions on repair, particularly when the 
contract at hand is a standard form contract, involving parties of unequal 
bargaining power, rather than an agreement between commercial parties 
dealing at arm’s length.211  Among such doctrines, the public policy 
exception to contract enforcement or the unconscionability doctrine may 
prove particularly relevant.212  The downside to simply relying on these 
doctrines is that there is a great uncertainty involved in their application, 
which leaves consumers exposed to potential liability.  Moreover, in order to 
invalidate a contract, a consumer would need to be prepared to dispute the 
terms.213 
 
 209. To begin with, the contractual route cannot be used against entities with which the 
patent owner does not have privity of contract. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of 
Friction?:  Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 
12 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 115, 119 (1997) (“Parties must be in privity with each other for a 
contract to be formed.”).  In addition, the remedies for a breach of contract are generally not 
as broad as the remedies for patent infringement. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Contract Versus 
Property Damages, 12 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 1, 7–8 (2013) (“In patent law, the shift from 
contract to infringement remedies could also increase the magnitude of damages.”).  Even 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006), which made it more difficult for patent plaintiffs to obtain injunctions, injunction is 
still a common remedy in patent infringement lawsuits. See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, Against 
Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 402 (2014) (“[E]ven after eBay, 
permanent injunctions remain the norm in patent cases when there is a finding of 
infringement.”).  In contrast, under contract law, specific performance is deemed an 
extraordinary remedy, awarded at the court’s discretion. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Case 
for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 272 (1979).  The shift from infringement 
remedies to contract remedies could also decrease the magnitude of monetary damages 
available to the plaintiff. See Ben-Shahar, supra, at 7–8.  Among other things, while contract 
monetary remedies are limited to expectation damages, in a patent infringement suit, the court 
may award punitive damages and recovery of attorney’s fees as well. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–
285 (2012); see also Ben-Shahar, supra, at 8 (noting, in addition, the longer statute of 
limitations available under patent law). 
 210. A threat of litigation through cease-and-desist letters would likely be enough to deter 
any individual consumer. See generally Grinvald, supra note 195. 
 211. For an example of such a uniform contract, see supra note 202 and accompanying 
text. 
 212. For relevant discussion, see Daniel Laster, The Secret Is Out:  Patent Law Preempts 
Mass Market License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 621, 693–97 (2006).  In addition to these doctrines, in certain instances, rules 
regarding contract formation may enable a court to avoid enforcement.  Notably, the patent 
misuse doctrine is irrelevant in such cases, where the enforcement of post-sale restrictions 
under patent law is already barred under the exhaustion doctrine and the only question is 
whether the patentee should be allowed to enforce such restrictions under contract law. See 
infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 213. The problem here is that many of these standard-form contracts now include 
mandatory arbitration clauses, which prevent consumers from banding together in a class 
action lawsuit against manufacturers for any such abusive contractual terms. See, e.g., Legal 
Policies: Conditions of Use, AMAZON, https://smile.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
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It may be more effective if states were to declare post-sale restrictions on 
repair void and unenforceable.  This can be done as part of the same state 
legislation that deals with the right to repair.  In fact, as discussed in Part I.C, 
the proposed model legislation already includes a provision along these lines 
that applies in a more limited context.  Under section 5(b) of the proposed 
legislation, “any provision in [the terms of a contract between an authorized 
repair provider and an original equipment manufacturer] that purports to 
waive, avoid, restrict, or limit the original equipment manufacturer’s 
obligations to comply with this Act shall be void and unenforceable.”214  The 
right to repair legislation could be more widely applicable and effective if it 
explicitly provides that consumers have a right to repair their products; while 
section 5(b) should be expanded to provide that any restriction on the right 
to repair would be void and unenforceable in any type of transfer contract.215 
c.  Sales Versus Licenses 
One important limitation of the use of the exhaustion doctrine as a safe 
harbor for repair activities has to do with the distinction between sales and 
licenses embedded in patent exhaustion jurisprudence and reaffirmed by the 
Court in Impression Products.  In contrast to an authorized sale of a patented 
product, a mere license of same product does not trigger exhaustion.216  
Therefore, if a firm manages to structure its transactions with its consumers 
in a manner that does not entail full transfer of ownership—for instance, by 
adopting subscription-based or leasing business models—then the 
exhaustion doctrine would not apply.  Such a firm could continue to impose 
effective limitations on the use of its products, including no-repair clauses.217 
In light of this distinction, it is likely that certain businesses would try to 
hide the true economic nature of a transaction and disguise it as a mere 
license when it is actually a sale.  The need to ensure that intellectual property 
rights would not be used to circumvent the right to repair increases the 
urgency of developing tests that enable courts to distinguish between de facto 
sales and other transactions that are authentically not sales. 
To be sure, even if a transaction is not classified as a sale and no exhaustion 
is triggered, the ability to enforce post-sale restrictions on repair via patent 
law is not guaranteed.  As noted above, such restrictions could be invalid as 
 
display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088&ref_=footer_cou [https://perma.cc/L4N7-U7FE] 
(last updated May 21, 2018) (specifying arbitration, except for small claims actions). 
 214. See Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21. 
 215. The term “void and unenforceable” is important because it allows for consumers to 
disregard any such terms without having to cause any contract terms that fall into this category 
to be voided. 
 216. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1534 (2017). 
 217. See Aaron Perzanowski, Lexmark and the Future of Sales, END OWNERSHIP (June 1, 
2017), http://www.theendofownership.com/blog/2017/6/1/thoughts-on-impression-products-
v-lexmark [https://perma.cc/KZU6-2U4Q] (“Another potential concern is that companies 
like Lexmark will stop selling products altogether and move to lease, rental, or 
subscription models that don’t entail transfers of ownership to consumers.”). 
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far as contract law is concerned.218  Moreover, in light of the strong policy 
considerations favoring repair, courts should consider such restrictions to be 
patent misuse.219  To the extent post-sale restrictions constitute patent 
misuse, a patentee who imposes such restrictions cannot enforce their 
patent.220  Thus, this doctrine may serve as a tool to preserve a right to repair 
in the face of non-repair clauses, even for users that are not protected by 
exhaustion.  Finally, certain contractual restrictions that seek to inhibit 
competition in repair markets may run afoul of federal antitrust laws as 
unlawful agreements in restraint of trade.221 
2.  Copyright Implications of Repair 
Copyright law already recognizes, to a limited extent, the notion of a right 
to repair at this core layer.  Section 117(c) of the Copyright Act provides an 
exemption to owners or lessees of computers that allows them to make copies 
of software in order to maintain or repair the machine without infringing 
upon the copyright of the software.222 
Unfortunately, though, there is another layer in the Copyright Act that is 
incompatible with a right to repair.  Section 1201 of the DMCA prevents 
anyone from disabling a technological protection measure that a copyright 
owner has placed on a work in order to protect its copyrighted software (a 
“digital lock”).223  In practice, almost any type of consumer technological 
product includes software, which in turn, likely includes such a digital 
lock.224  Consumers cannot disable the digital lock without being liable under 
§ 1201, even if the purpose for such hack was to diagnose, maintain, or repair 
the product.  If the disabling is done willfully and for commercial gain, the 
circumventer may be criminally liable.225 
 
 218. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 219. Patent misuse can be raised as a defense in patent litigation when the patentee takes 
unfair advantage of its patent rights. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in 
Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1467 (2014). 
 220. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 
78 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1613 (1990) (“If a patentee has misused his patent, the courts will 
neither enjoin an infringement of that patent nor award damages to the patentee.”). 
 221. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is 
declared to be illegal.”); see also infra note 324 (discussing antitrust implications of a refusal 
to sell or license replacement parts). 
 222. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2012); see Lateef Mtima, So Dark the Con(Tu) of Man:  The Quest 
for a Software Derivative Work Right in Section 117, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2008) 
(noting that “section 117 functions as one of the chief mechanisms through which the public 
interest in software programs is balanced against the copyright holders’ property rights in such 
programs”). 
 223. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 224. See, e.g., Kenny, supra note 2 (describing the digital lock on newer Keurig coffee 
machines). 
 225. 17 U.S.C. § 1204. 
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Fortunately, § 1201 provides a safety valve in that it authorizes the U.S. 
Copyright Office to adopt exemptions to these strict prohibitions.226  These 
exemptions are short-term fixes and are only valid for three years, although 
they can be renewed.227  With the exemptions announced in 2018, the repair 
movement scored a victory in persuading the Copyright Office to officially 
recognize repair as a reason to circumvent digital locks.228  The 2018 
exemptions, valid until 2021, allow users to access software provided that 
they circumvent the digital lock to diagnose, repair, or maintain certain 
devices in which the software is embedded.229  However, the types of devices 
that these exemptions cover are limited to “motorized land vehicles,” 
smartphones, or “home appliance[s] or home system[s],” such as 
refrigerators or thermostats.230  The list excludes, for instance, aircraft and 
boats, but includes increasingly ubiquitous voice-assisted home devices such 
as Amazon’s Alexa.231 
While the 2018 exemptions are exciting news for the repair movement and 
provide individual consumers with greater freedom in this core layer, a major 
downside is that these exemptions are temporary.  In order for the exemptions 
to continue beyond three years, the Copyright Office needs to renew them.232  
On past occasions, the Copyright Office has decided not to renew much-
needed exemptions, including the “unlocking” exemption that had been 
provided from 2006 to 2012 to allow consumers to connect their wireless 
 
 226. Id. § 1201. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Mitch Stoltz, New Exemptions to DMCA Section 1201 Are Welcome, but Don’t 
Go Far Enough, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/new-exemptions-dmca-section-1201-are-welcome-
dont-go-far-enough [https://perma.cc/784V-NBW8]. 
 229. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2019). 
 230. Id. § 201.40(b)(9)–(10) (“Computer programs that are contained in and control the 
functioning of a lawfully acquired smartphone or home appliance or home system, such as a 
refrigerator, thermostat, HVAC or electrical system, when circumvention is a necessary step 
to allow the diagnosis, maintenance or repair of such a device or system, and is not 
accomplished for the purpose of gaining access to other copyrighted works”). 
 231. See Chaim Gartenberg, New Copyright Exemptions Let You Legally Repair Your 
Phone or Jailbreak Voice Assistants, VERGE (Oct. 25, 2018, 3:58 PM), https:// 
www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/10/25/18024332/us-copyright-office-right-to-repair-
dcma-exemptions [https://perma.cc/6DQE-6HAF]; Hamza Shaban, ‘Right to Repair’ 
Advocates Claim Major Victory in Smartphone Copyright Exemption, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/26/right-repair-advocates-
claim-major-victory-new-smartphone-copyright-exemption/ [https://perma.cc/Y6BG-E7ER]. 
 232. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D) (2012) (“The Librarian shall publish any class of 
copyrighted works for which the Librarian has determined, pursuant to the rulemaking 
conducted under subparagraph (C), that noninfringing uses by persons who are users of a 
copyrighted work are, or are likely to be, adversely affected, and the prohibition contained in 
subparagraph (A) shall not apply to such users with respect to such class of works for the 
ensuing 3-year period.”); see also Frequently Asked Questions About the Section 1201 
Rulemaking, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/faqs.html [https:// 
perma.cc/2HZK-9EHP] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
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devices to an alternative network.233  Therefore, this partial victory for the 
repair movement may end up being temporary.234  As evident by this 
Article’s thesis, the authors support a renewal of this exemption or, 
preferably, that Congress enacts these (or even more encompassing) 
exemptions through legislation. 
One other limitation of the repair exemptions is that they do not explicitly 
authorize consumers to use independent repair shops to take advantage of 
their ability to repair.235  Indeed, the “anti-trafficking” provisions of § 1201 
may be implicated once the broken machine is given to a repair shop, given 
that these shops are likely turning to instruction manuals provided by third 
parties online.  Trafficking in anti-circumvention information is prohibited 
and the Copyright Office is not authorized to provide an exemption in this 
respect.236  While the 2018 exemptions are not restricted, by their terms, to 
individual consumers,237 the Copyright Office clarified that “[g]iven the 
legal uncertainty in this area, services electing to proceed with circumvention 
activity pursuant to the exemption do so at their peril.”238  This limitation 
hampers consumers’ ability to use the exemption, as many do not have the 
skill, time, or will to repair their own products.  Part III.B discusses this issue 
further while examining the second circle of activities comprising the right 
to repair. 
B.  Repair Shops and the Diffusion of Repair Information 
The second layer of the right to repair expands it in two different ways.  
First, it expands the identity of the persons entitled to repair—this layer 
encompasses not only consumers but also independent repair shops.  Second, 
this layer broadens the scope of permitted activities—it includes not only 
repair itself but also advertising repair activities and the diffusion of repair 
information through any type of medium (for example, instructional videos 
on YouTube or instructional manuals on websites). 
Admittedly, expanding the scope of the right to repair to include 
independent repair shops is not supported by some of the policy justifications 
discussed above—including the autonomy argument, the related personality 
 
 233. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260, 65,264–66 (Oct. 26, 2012) (describing the 
history and subsequent narrowing of the unlocking exemption).  It took an act of Congress to 
overturn the denial of the exemption. See Unlocking Consumer Choice and Wireless 
Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113-144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 note (2012 & Supp. V 2018)). 
 234. See generally Aaron Perzanowski, The Limits of Copyright Office Expertise, 33 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 755–56 (2018) (explaining the origins of the triennial rulemaking 
process). 
 235. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 14, at 222–25. 
 236. See infra notes 254–57 and accompanying text. 
 237. In fact, the 2018 regulation attempted to stay neutral and instead deleted the term 
“authorized owner” that was originally included in the previous exemptions as the entity able 
to take advantage of the exemptions. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 14, at 225. 
 238. Id. 
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theory justification, and certain aspects associated with human flourishing 
discussed under the utilitarian account.239  However, independent repair 
shops must be included in the scope of the right to repair if consumer 
autonomy in their choice of vendor is to be preserved.240  It is likely that most 
consumers would rather have their products fixed by professionals.  
Therefore, to promote the policy goals supporting a right to repair, 
independent repair shops must be allowed to conduct their business.  In 
addition, enabling activity by independent repair shops has unique social 
benefits—most importantly, repair shops boost the economic vitality of the 
U.S. economy.  According to some estimates, “repair jobs represent three 
percent of overall employment” in the country.241 
Once the right to repair is expanded to include consumers and repair shops, 
they should also be enabled to advertise their services and share repair 
information—as advertising and information sharing are essential to 
exercising the right to repair in a meaningful manner.  Permitting these 
activities is not likely to have a significant detrimental effect on incentives to 
innovate as these activities do not cut into the primary market for any 
protected intellectual creations embodied in the product.  In addition, similar 
to the core layer of repair activities, no active duty is imposed on the original 
manufacturers in this context.  Therefore, ensuring that intellectual property 
rights do not interfere with these activities is justified.  Interestingly, once 
again, the proposed model state legislation does not address these activities, 
despite the fact that, as with the core circle, intellectual property law—
particularly copyright law and trademark law—could impose a roadblock to 
the full exercise of a right to repair in this domain. 
1.  Activity of Independent Repair Shops 
Independent repair shops undertake a number of activities that make them 
vulnerable to intellectual property liability, beyond actual repair.242  First, in 
advertising their services, many independent repair shops use the 
manufacturers’ trademarks.  For example, many independent repair shops 
use the lowercase “i” to designate that they fix iPhones or other Apple 
products.  Others, like iPad Rehab, use the trademark in the name of the 
business.243  Another advertising method is to use trademarks in business 
descriptions.  If repair shops cannot use a brand’s trademark in advertising, 
 
 239. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 240. If the only choice a consumer has is to have their product repaired by an authorized 
repair vendor, then their ability to make a fully free choice has been taken away by the 
manufacturers. 
 241. Wiens, supra note 5. 
 242. With respect to the repair itself, the discussion in Part III.A does not change much 
once we expand the privilege to repair patented products from the consumers themselves to 
repair shops. 
 243. See Koebler, supra note 9. 
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how would consumers know that they could bring their branded products to 
the independent repair shop? 
If trademark law could be used to prevent this form of commercial speech, 
competition for repair services would be slim to none.  Fortunately, 
trademark law already recognizes the need to carve out a space where 
trademarks are used by third parties to advertise, in order to combat 
potentially anticompetitive behavior by trademark owners.244  Courts have 
developed the doctrine of “nominative fair use,” under which third parties 
are able to utilize trademarks to the extent necessary to communicate 
information regarding their businesses to consumers.245  In R. G. Smith v. 
Chanel, Inc.,246 the Ninth Circuit case that originated this doctrine of 
nominative fair use, the defendant was found to have made noninfringing use 
of Chanel’s No. 5 mark.247  The defendant permissibly used the mark 
“Chanel No. 5” for a competitive need—to compare its product to that of 
Chanel’s.248  This nominative fair use doctrine has gained acceptance, and 
courts have held that using original manufacturers’ word marks in similar 
contexts—including by repair shops and parts resellers—is noninfringing.249 
The problem remains, though, when manufacturers still attempt to enforce 
their trademarks in these situations.250  Independent repair shops, particularly 
small businesses or sole proprietorships, are likely to be similarly situated to 
consumers in terms of resources to fight back.  Additionally, independent 
 
 244. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (9th 
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 245. See Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1977, 
1997 (2019) (describing the nominative fair use defense). 
 246. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 247. Id. at 563. 
 248. Id. at 568. (“As we have noted, the most effective way (and in some cases the only 
practical way) in which others may compete in satisfying the demand for the product is to 
produce it and tell the public they have done so, and if they could be barred from this effort 
appellees would have found a way to acquire a practical monopoly in the unpatented product 
to which they are not legally entitled.”).  As an additional layer, Smith had only used the 
“word” mark of the Chanel trademark and not the stylized mark, which a later Ninth Circuit 
opinion would hold is valuable in the analysis as to whether the defendant is only using as 
much of plaintiff’s mark as is necessary. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Both The Star and USA Today reference the New 
Kids only to the extent necessary to identify them as the subject of the polls; they do not use 
the New Kids’ distinctive logo or anything else that isn’t needed to make the announcements 
intelligible to readers.”). 
 249. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1176–77 (holding that Toyota is not entitled 
to a wholesale injunction against a broker of genuine Lexus cars). 
 250. See Susan Frohling, OEM Trademarks in the Aftermarket:  Exploring the Boundaries, 
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/09/19/oem-
trademarks-aftermarket-exploring-boundaries/id=101163/ [https://perma.cc/6QPA-M5ZW] 
(discussing such cases where manufacturers attempted to enforce their trademarks).  In 
addition, there is a split among the circuits as to how the nominative fair use is utilized and 
whether some level of confusion is still allowed. See MCCARTHY, supra note 61, § 23:11. 
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repair shop owners would not always know that these types of claims are not 
grounded in current trademark law.  Therefore, there is still a need for some 
type of legal clarity regarding the scope of trademark rights and the 
consequences for unfounded claims of infringement.  Some relief might 
come in the form of a state law providing a cause of action to address 
“abusive threats” made by manufacturers.251 
Notably, where repair shops and resellers use the original manufacturer’s 
logo (or “stylized” mark), courts more readily find trademark 
infringement.252  In today’s image-heavy world, an independent repair shop’s 
use of a manufacturer’s logo is likely essential for it to compete with 
authorized repair shops.253  Regardless, this issue is left aside for another day 
given that the use of the word marks is allowed, and it is questionable whether 
the sole use of logos is essential to effectively competing in the repair market. 
2.  Diffusion of Information 
Another activity that repair shops and proponents of a right to repair 
undertake is the diffusion of information on how to repair, including how to 
disable security locks and reset them.  Unfortunately, § 1201 of the DMCA 
acts as a roadblock in this context.  Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) (the 
“anti-trafficking” provisions) prohibit the distribution of information about 
the ways to disable a digital lock.254  This prevents repair shops from posting 
content online and distributing information related to disabling digital locks.  
In addition, distributors are exposed to criminal liability if they distribute the 
information willfully and for commercial gain.255  In its announcement of the 
§ 1201 exemptions, the Copyright Office was explicit that it was not 
authorized to provide any exemptions from § 1201(a)(2) or § 1201(b).256  
This means that even to the extent consumers or independent repair shops are 
permitted to undertake repairs, they are often not allowed to share 
information on how to do so.257 
 
 251. See Grinvald, supra note 195, at 449. 
 252. See, e.g., Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(upholding an injunction in part on the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trade dress). 
 253. Another issue is whether a repair shop or other e-recycler can utilize the trademark on 
the repaired product.  For the most part, trademark law recognizes the right to use the original 
trademark in these instances, up until the point where the product is so extensively 
reconditioned that it is materially different from the original product. See, e.g., Nitro Leisure 
Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1360–64, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining 
the “material difference” test). 
 254. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2012). 
 255. See id. § 1204. 
 256. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5 (“The anti-trafficking provisions provide 
vital protections to copyright owners, and Congress did not authorize the Librarian to grant 
exemptions from them.”). 
 257. Wiens, supra note 5. 
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The Copyright Office recognizes this significant concern.258  But Congress 
is the only body of government that could revise the law to provide for an 
exemption from the DMCA anti-trafficking provisions that would cover the 
activity of independent repair shops even if they use online manuals.259  Such 
legislation has been introduced in the past, and the repair movement’s goal 
is to create momentum to enact it in the future.260  This Article’s thesis 
supports this direction. 
Notably, § 107 of the Copyright Act (the “fair use” provision) recognizes 
that there are certain uses of copyrighted works that should be considered 
noninfringing.261  The diffusion of information regarding repairs, even if it 
incorporates copyrighted material (for example, software code) may 
constitute fair use—provided that it does not relate to the disabling of a digital 
lock.  The fair use provision may assist companies like iFixit, that routinely 
create their own instructional videos showing how to fix the hardware of 
electronic products, to continue making such videos available to the 
public.262  The problem for smaller independent repair shops or individuals 
that may wish to act similarly is that relying on fair use provides cold comfort 
as manufacturers can still claim that the distribution of copyrighted materials 
does not qualify as fair use.  This concern is heightened by the uncertainty 
involved in fair use determinations.263  As mentioned above, these claims 
typically come in the form of cease-and-desist letters.264  If repair shops or 
individuals receiving such a letter decide neither to cease nor desist, they 
open themselves up to expensive and lengthy litigation.  Therefore, unless 
 
 258. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5 (“In this proceeding, proponents of the 
vehicle repair exemption again request provision for third-party assistance, arguing that 
limiting the exemption to individual owners threatens to render it effectively meaningless for 
those who lack the technical knowledge to access and manipulate increasingly complex 
embedded computer systems.  The Acting Register is sympathetic to these concerns and has 
attempted to draft the exemption language in a manner that accommodates such assistance to 
the extent it does not implicate the anti-trafficking provisions.”).  In addition, the Acting 
Register recommended removing the current exemption language requiring that 
circumvention be “undertaken by the authorized owner.” Id. at 224.  While the statutory 
language is far from clear, and the courts have yet to address this issue, there is at least a 
plausible argument that some forms of third-party assistance involving circumvention will not 
rise to the level of a prohibited “service” in all instances. 
 259. See id. at 5 (“The Office continues to believe that legislation permitting third-party 
assistance in appropriate circumstances would benefit stakeholders and provide valuable 
clarity to the overall statutory scheme.”). 
 260. Wiens, supra note 5.  The Act did not make it out of subcommittee. See Unlocking 
Technology Act of 2015, H.R. 1587, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 261. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also More Information on Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html [https://perma.cc/7NE5-BU9R] 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 262. See Repair Guides, IFIXIT, http://www.ifixit.com/guide [https://perma.cc/ZNG2-
ABS4] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 263. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 575 (2008) (reporting that 30.4 percent of preliminary 
injunction decisions and 24.1 percent of bench trial opinions found in favor of fair use). 
 264. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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action is taken at the federal level to provide a safe harbor from liability for 
diffusion of repair-related information,265 it is likely that the diffusion of such 
information will be limited and only undertaken by those who are less 
adverse to litigation.266 
C.  Enabling Competition in the Market for Replacement Parts 
The third circle necessary for an effective right to repair regime is a right 
to make, import, sell, and use replacement parts in competition with the 
original equipment manufacturer.  Repairing a product often entails the need 
to replace certain parts or components.  Thus, consumers and independent 
repair shops must have access to replacement parts.  Yet, without competition 
in the market for replacement parts, consumers and repair shop owners are 
entirely dependent on the supply of parts by the original manufacturer.267  If 
no such parts are available in the market, consumers have no choice but to 
have their products repaired by the original manufacturer or its authorized 
agents.268  Even if the original manufacturer supplies replacement parts in 
the market, monopolistic pricing of such parts on its behalf may result in 
consumers avoiding repairs altogether or using different replacement parts, 
if available.  In the latter case, the desire to avoid paying the high costs of 
original parts may result in a lower-quality repaired product.  Altogether, 
then, a right to repair can only be implemented effectively if original 
manufacturers do not control the markets for replacement parts.  As further 
discussed below, opening the market for repair parts to competition is not 
likely to deprive original manufacturers of legitimate profits that are 
necessary to incentivize them to develop new products.  Notably, with respect 
to this circle of activities as well, manufacturers are under no duty to perform 
any affirmative action. 
 
 265. See, e.g., PERZANOWKSI & SCHULTZ, supra note 175, at 176–77; Wiens, supra note 18. 
 266. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).  For 
example, iFixit hosts user-generated how-to guides, including those related to software. See, 
e.g., Aaron Cooke et al., How to Install macOS Mojave on Unsupported Macs, IFIXIT, 
https://www.ifixit.com/Guide/How+to+install+macOS+Mojave+on+Unsupported+Macs/11
5162 [https://perma.cc/79BV-Z6G6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 267. For example, the car repair shops were in this situation prior to the 2014 nationwide 
memorandum of understanding. See Kyle Wiens, You Gotta Fight for Your Right to Repair 
Your Car, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2014/02/you-gotta-fight-for-your-right-to-repair-your-car/283791/ [https://perma.cc/K52R-
WTV4]. 
 268. Interestingly, the growing availability of 3D printing technology may alleviate this 
concern to an extent:  3D printing of replacement parts by individuals may be hard to detect 
and not worth pursuing, thus avoiding effective enforcement by intellectual property owners. 
For discussion of 3D printing and intellectual property, see generally Deven R. Desai & 
Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1691 (2014); Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement 
in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World 
Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460 (2015). 
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Interestingly, this aspect as well is not addressed in the model legislation, 
which focuses on the duty of the original equipment manufacturer to make 
parts available on fair and reasonable terms.  Yet, under the model legislation, 
an original equipment manufacturer is under no obligation to supply a part if 
such part is no longer available.269  Thus, at its unilateral discretion, the 
original manufacturer may stop supplying parts for a certain product—for 
instance, when the warranty for all units sold expires and later models are 
available.  In such cases, the manufacturer’s duty to supply parts under the 
proposed legislation would fade away.  This reinforces the importance of 
enabling competition in markets for replacement parts.  Unfortunately, 
manufacturers often resort to patent law or trademark law to forestall 
competitors from producing and selling competitive replacement parts.  Both 
areas of law are addressed below.270 
1.  Patented Replacement Parts 
Courts dealing with the patent exhaustion doctrine have clarified that 
repair may entail the replacement of spent elements and, yet, still be 
permissible.271  However, a challenge arises when the replacement part itself 
is protected by a utility or design patent.  Even though the sale of the product 
exhausts the rights of the patentee with respect to every patented part 
embedded in the product,272 exhaustion does not permit the purchaser to 
make additional copies of patented items.273  Thus, when parts are protected 
 
 269. See Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21, § 3(a). 
 270. While copyright law could also be implicated by attempting to provide a space for 
competitive replacement parts, the concerns are more theoretical in nature and have not been 
raised in actual arguments. 
 271. In Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., the defendant 
replaced the worn-out fabric of the patentable convertible top on his car and the Supreme 
Court classified it as a permissible repair. 365 U.S. 336, 345–46 (1961); see Sarnoff, supra 
note 30, at 3 (“The consumer repair right [under the patent exhaustion doctrine] is very broad.  
It includes restoring or rebuilding damaged original parts, as well as substituting new 
replacement parts.”). 
 272. While the exhaustion doctrine has been developed in the context of utility patents, it 
is most likely applicable to the exact same extent with respect to design patents as well.  35 
U.S.C. § 171(b) (2012) clarifies that “[t]he provisions of this title relating to patents for 
inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.”  Admittedly, 
§ 171(b) refers to the provisions of the statute, whereas the doctrine of patent exhaustion is 
entirely judge-made.  Yet, absent case law that provides otherwise, it is likely that such a major 
patent law doctrine that has been developed in cases dealing with utility patents is also 
applicable in the context of design patents.  Most importantly, the policy considerations that 
underlie the exhaustion doctrine, including the desire to accommodate free use and alienability 
of patented goods released into the stream of commerce, are equally applicable in both 
contexts.  For a recent case supporting this conclusion, see Automotive Body Parts Ass’n v. 
Ford Global Technologies, LLC for an explanation that “[t]here is no case dividing patent law 
this way—i.e., creating separate exhaustion doctrines for utility and design patents.” 293 F. 
Supp. 3d 690, 706 (E.D. Mich. 2018), aff’d, 930 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 273. See, e.g., Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 284 (2013) (clarifying that “the 
doctrine restricts the patentee’s rights only as to the ‘particular article’ sold, it leaves 
untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented 
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by patents and they need to be replaced in the course of repair, it is only the 
patent holder who can make and supply those parts.274  Registration of a 
patent over a part of a product could, thus, be used to circumvent the 
application of the exhaustion doctrine that would otherwise sanction repair 
of the product.275 
Unfortunately, this is not a mere theoretical concern.  In recent decades, 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has increasingly granted design 
patents to original equipment manufacturers for components of their 
products.276  This practice has risen since 1980, following In re Zahn,277 in 
which the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that even fragments of 
parts of products can be protected by design patents.278  Design patents are 
not only granted—they are also successfully asserted in litigation.  This 
practice has attracted criticism in connection with motor vehicles, where 
replacement parts (such as doors, headlights, bumpers, etc.) are often needed 
to repair a car that was damaged in a collision.279  The growth in registrations 
of such partial-product exterior design patents has accelerated since 2005.280  
In response to this, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced the Promoting 
Automotive Repair, Trade, and Sales Act of 2017 (PARTS Act) in 
 
item” (citation omitted)); see also Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 31 (2001) (“The patentee retains the 
rights to prevent anyone else, including the buyer, from making, using, or selling additional 
copies of the patented item.”); Rinehart, supra note 119, at 484 n.4 (“Under current law, the 
patent owner retains his right to exclude purchasers of the articles from making the patented 
invention anew.”). 
 274. One of the arguments brought up in Automotive Body Parts Ass’n was that design 
patents over components of a larger product are exhausted upon the first authorized sale of 
such a product. 293 F. Supp. 3d. at 694.  The court rejected this argument while refusing to 
formulate a special exhaustion doctrine in design law that would be different than the one 
employed in the context of utility patents. Id. 
 275. See Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 1–2 (“Partial-product and fragment design patents 
effectively override the exhaustion doctrine . . . .  They do so by prohibiting refurbishment or 
new manufacture of parts that would be used to repair the overall products . . . .”). 
 276. See id. (noting the growing practice of granting partial-product design patents for 
repair parts to original equipment manufacturers). 
 277. 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
 278. Id. at 268; see Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 11 (noting that the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals “revised the common and widespread understanding that design patents were 
limited to the entire appearance of entire products”). 
 279. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 4 (noting that the practice of granting and asserting 
partial product design patents “effectively overrides” the right to repair pursuant to the 
exhaustion doctrine); Dennis Crouch, Design Patents and Repair Parts, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 
22, 2010), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/design-patents-and-repair-parts.html [https:// 
perma.cc/RF44-ZRFK] (noting that “many automobile body parts are protected through 
design patent” and “[t]his allows the original manufacturers control over the repair-parts 
market as well”).  Surely, design patents for small parts of larger products were registered and 
asserted in other industries as well.  For examples, see Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 
OHIO ST. L.J. 107, 123 n.95 (2016). 
 280. KEEP AUTO PARTS AFFORDABLE, http://www.keepautopartsaffordable.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/6GBY-Q7S6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (portraying a graph showing a 
significant increase in the number of design patents on collision repair parts from 2005 to 
2015). 
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Congress.281  The PARTS Act would create a narrow exception from design 
patent infringement for collision repair parts for cars.282  Under the proposed 
legislation, while limiting the possibility of enforcing partial-product design 
patents against independent suppliers of parts or parties who use those parts 
for legitimate repairs, the patent owner could still assert the patent against 
competitors who incorporate the design into their own cars. 
This Article supports that proposed legislation.  Such an exception from 
patent infringement could also be useful in connection with other types of 
products, including electronics.  While competition in the market for 
replacement parts is considered vital in the car industry, it should be 
reinforced in nonautomotive replacement parts markets too. 
An alternative course of action is to avoid granting patents for repair parts 
at all.  This measure, which may seem more radical than an exception from 
infringement liability, could actually be implemented without the need to 
amend the Patent Act.  Two arguments could be made under the current 
statutory scheme to support the exclusion of partial-product design 
patents.283  The first argument is that designs of partial products do not 
qualify as subject matter protected under the Patent Act.  Pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 171(a), patent protection can only be awarded to a “design for an 
article of manufacture.”284  Arguably, a component of a larger product, which 
is never sold to be used by itself and whose only value is for restoring the 
original appearance of such larger product, should not be considered an 
“article of manufacture” for purposes of the Act.285 
 
 281. S. 812, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 1879, 115th Cong. (2017).  Similar legislation was 
introduced in the 114th Congress. S. 560, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1057, 114th Cong. (2015); 
see also KEEP AUTO PARTS AFFORDABLE, supra note 280. 
 282. The bill proposes to reduce the period during which car companies can enforce their 
design patents against sellers or users of such parts from fifteen years to thirty months from 
the date the car is first placed on the market.  Alternative suppliers could manufacture, test, 
and import such components for legitimate repairs even during such thirty-month period 
without it being considered infringing. S. 812, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017); H.R. 1879, 115th 
Cong. § 2 (2017). 
 283. See generally Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 4–5 (arguing that Congress has never 
authorized such patents). 
 284. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). 
 285. See Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 1, 5 (noting that Congress has authorized design patents 
only for the overall appearance of “articles of manufacture” and not for parts of such articles, 
and explaining that “[t]his is because ornamental designs for functional products are perceived 
in their entirety as part of the overall functional products that they help to form”); see also 
Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161, 208 (2015) (noting that the 
patented design should be conceptualized as the design as applied to a particular type of 
product, while defining product as “something sold by an enterprise to its customers”).  While 
parts could be sold in the marketplace separately from the entire products they comprise, if 
this is only done when needed to repair the larger product, such parts should not be considered 
“articles of manufacture.” 
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The second argument could be that the design of a partial product is not 
ornamental, as is required by the Act.286  This is clearly the case when it 
comes to designs for internal parts of a product, which no one buys for their 
appearance.287  Yet, this can also be true with respect to exterior parts.  The 
claim that partial-product designs lack ornamentality was recently made by 
the Automotive Body Part Association (ABPA) in litigation against Ford.288  
The Eastern District of Michigan rejected this claim.289  The ABPA argued 
that when a car is damaged, its owner simply wants parts that would restore 
the car to its original look.290  As consumers that seek to repair their vehicles 
do not select parts for their design, the design is not a “matter of concern” 
and does not deserve patent protection.291  The court rejected this argument, 
noting that the “matter of concern” inquiry is not necessarily constrained to 
the perspective of a vehicle owner at the time that she is buying a replacement 
part—as opposed to the time she initially buys the car.292  The ABPA also 
argued that, as part of the ornamentality requirement, a design for an article 
of manufacture could not be solely dictated by the function of the article; yet 
designs of body parts are dictated by the need to both physically fit onto the 
car and match its overall aesthetic.293  The court rejected this argument as 
well and refused to import the aesthetic-functionality doctrine from 
trademark law to design law.294 
The court may have been too quick in rejecting the ABPA’s non-
ornamentality claim.  A detailed analysis of the arguments made in this 
litigation exceeds the scope of this Article, but two interrelated observations 
are in order.  First, the fact that parts are not sold as separate items in the 
market other than for purposes of repair seems to be a relevant factor in the 
inquiry, and the court may not have accorded it sufficient weight.  Second, it 
is not clear that, in interpreting the law, the court gave sufficient attention to 
 
 286. The requirement that a design would be ornamental is stated in 35 U.S.C. § 171(a):  
“[w]hoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 
 287. See Burstein, supra note 279, at 135 (“No one buys a tractor because of the appearance 
of its internal gears.”). 
 288. Auto. Body Parts Ass’n v. Ford Glob. Techs., LLC, 293 F. Supp. 3d 690, 699, 701 
(E.D. Mich. 2018), aff’d, 930 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  An alternative argument raised by 
the ABPA was that the patents in question are “unenforceable . . . because the patent rights 
are exhausted upon the first authorized sale of the vehicle.” Id. at 694.  This argument was 
rejected by the court for reasons explored above. See supra notes 272–75 and accompanying 
text. 
 289. Auto. Body Parts Ass’n, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 699. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 699–701. 
 293. Id. at 701; cf. Registered Designs Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 88 § 7 (Eng.) 
(providing that the right in a registered design of a component part which may be used for the 
purpose of the repair of a complex product so as to restore its original appearance is not 
infringed by the use for that purpose of any design protected by the registration). 
 294. Auto. Body Parts Ass’n, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 702.  The claim that the designs are dictated 
by their need to physically fit the car was rejected on a factual basis, as there is a pool of 
available designs that could fit. Id. at 703. 
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underlying policy considerations.  In addition to the policy arguments made 
above in support of competition in markets for repair parts, patent protection 
for repair parts does not promote the decorative arts or provide other public 
benefits.  The original manufacturers have a strong incentive to develop new 
designs for their products in order to induce buyers to choose them over the 
alternatives at the purchase stage.295  Moreover, once a design for a product 
is disclosed to the public, so too is the design of each one of its parts.296  
Altogether, then, independent design protection for parts, on top of the 
protection for the design of the entire product, “provides nothing more to the 
public—it merely provides a windfall to the [product]’s manufacturer.”297  
Such protection, which results in increased prices and insurance premiums, 
comes at the expense of consumers, who have already paid “patented prices” 
when they purchased their original products.298 
2.  Trademark Law Implications 
Like their overuse of patent law, manufacturers have also overused 
trademark law to protect replacement parts, which can have similarly stifling 
effects on competition for such parts or for repair services.  This occurs where 
manufacturers obtain trademarks on parts themselves, such as grilles on the 
front of vehicles.299  Another use of trademark law to stifle competition in 
the repair market is the practice of claiming that refurbished replacement 
parts are counterfeits when they are actually authentic parts.300 
a.  Repair Parts as Registered Trademarks 
In the instances where manufacturers have obtained trademarks on parts 
of products, this Article makes a simple recommendation:  do not grant the 
trademark.301  In order to be registered as trademarks, product parts require 
evidence that consumers view the product part as a source indicator (and not 
 
 295. See Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 20 (“[P]atent law provides its incentives to produce 
improved designs, through the first sale of the entire purchased product that embodies a 
partial-product or fragment design patent.”). 
 296. See Burstein, supra note 279, at 137 (demonstrating this with respect to a car design, 
which once disclosed to the public, also discloses the design of the car’s fender). 
 297. See id. (noting that design patents for repair parts are undoubtedly valuable to their 
owners but have low or negative social value). 
 298. See Sarnoff, supra note 30, at 1, 3. 
 299. See, e.g., The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle grille, Registration No. 
3,453,754 (Ford Motor Company registration for the design of an automobile grille); The mark 
consists of a configuration of a vehicle taillight design, Registration No. 3,440,628 (Volvo Car 
Corporation registration for the design of car taillights) (cancelled due to lack of renewal). 
 300. Koebler, supra note 56. 
 301. This Article is not suggesting a full exemption of car parts from trademark protection 
but rather a more circumspect examination of such trademarks. 
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simply a car part).302  Based on a review of PTO actions for Ford’s grille 
design and Volvo’s back taillight design, trademark examiners appear to be 
skeptical of claims of product parts’ distinctiveness as trademarks and their 
lack of functionality.303  As the document files of these two trademark 
registrations indicate, the trademark examiners initially rejected the 
applications.304  In both instances, however, the trademarks were eventually 
granted after a lengthy back-and-forth between the manufacturers and the 
trademark examiners.305  While it is unclear how often the manufacturers 
enforce their registered parts trademarks against makers of compatible 
products, it is clear that some are doing so.306  If successful, manufacturers 
can claim exclusivity over a replacement part for as long as the manufacturer 
continues to use the part because trademark rights exist indefinitely as long 
as the parts are used in commerce.307  Further, having a registered trademark 
assists the manufacturers in keeping competitive look-alike parts from 
entering the country with the help of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) as discussed next. 
b.  Claiming That Parts Are Counterfeit Goods 
Manufacturers use trademark law to prevent the importation of 
replacement parts that contain manufacturers’ trademarks or appear similar 
to the part that is registered as a trademark.  In these instances, it is the 
government that is enforcing the trademark on behalf of the manufacturers, 
but it is no less problematic for the repair industry.  For example, the CBP 
routinely seizes replacement parts manufactured by LKQ Corporation, an 
 
 302. In trademark law parlance, this is called “acquired distinctiveness.”  Product 
configurations fall into the category of requiring proof of acquired distinctiveness. See Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000). 
 303. See The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle grille, U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 78/759,403 (filed Nov. 22, 2005), Office Action Outgoing, June 1, 
2006, http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn78759403&docId=OOA20060601142 
531#docIndex=22&page=1 [https://perma.cc/TQ34-FLTA] (denying trademark registration 
because Ford’s proposed mark is not inherently distinctive); The mark consists of a 
configuration of a vehicle taillight design, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/759,251 
(filed Nov. 22, 2005), Office Action Outgoing, May 26, 2006, 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn78759251&docId=OOA20060526222322#d
ocIndex=18&page=1 [https://perma.cc/8SZQ-K6N9] (denying Volvo’s trademark application 
because the mark appears to be functional). 
 304. See The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle grille, Registration No. 
3,453,754; The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle taillight design, Registration No. 
3,440,628. 
 305. See The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle grille, Registration No. 
3,453,754; The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle taillight design, Registration No. 
3,440,628. 
 306. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Vanzant, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071–72 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 307. See BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW:  AN OPEN-SOURCE CASEBOOK 282 (6th ed. 
2018) (“The registration may be renewed indefinitely provided that the registrant complies 
with the requirements of Lanham Act §§ 8 & 9, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058 & 1059.”). 
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automobile parts supplier, on the basis that the parts are “counterfeit.”308  
LKQ manufactures replacement parts that look like those of Ford, Honda, 
and other car manufacturers.  Some of these parts also happen to be registered 
as trademarks, which provides the CBP the authority to detain the imports.309  
LKQ recently filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security 
(the department that oversees the CBP), arguing that these seizures, which 
negatively impact its business, were made on an incorrect application of 
trademark law.310  LKQ argued that the CBP detained shipments that were 
not counterfeit even though the original manufacturers claimed that they 
were.311  Unfortunately, LKQ’s suit was eventually dismissed, in part based 
on a lack of jurisdiction by the federal district court.312 
The CBP has also detained and seized refurbished replacement products 
imported into the United States by independent repair shops on the grounds 
that they are counterfeit.313  However, refurbished replacement parts or 
products are generally not considered counterfeit, as they are goods that have 
been previously sold and then repaired to extend their utility.314  The 
Supreme Court has held that refurbished parts or products, to the extent that 
they do not mislead consumers into thinking they are new and original, are 
acceptable uses of another’s trademark.315 
This has not stopped the CBP from detaining such products at the border.  
And even after such seizures occur, the manufacturers are seemingly not 
educating the CBP that the seized products are not counterfeit.316  In these 
instances, if manufacturers were not granted registered trademarks on 
product parts, the CBP would likely not seize similar-looking imported parts 
(at least when they do not bear some other trademark).317  In any event, a 
practical approach to resolving this particular issue, as long as such 
 
 308. See LKQ Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 369 F. Supp. 3d 577, 587 (D. Del. 
2019) (listing the plaintiff’s allegations). 
 309. See, e.g., The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle grille, Registration No. 
3,453,754; The mark consists of a configuration of a vehicle taillight design, Registration No. 
3,440,628. 
 310. Tiffany Hu, Auto Parts Supplier Sues CBP for Seizing “Lawful” Parts, LAW360 (Feb. 
8, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1010399/auto-parts-supplier-sues-cbp-
for-seizing-lawful-parts [https://perma.cc/R9JR-UDPV]. 
 311. LKQ Corp., 369 F. Supp. 3d at 582. 
 312. See id. at 580 (granting the motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction and failure 
to state a claim). 
 313. See Koebler, supra note 9. 
 314. See Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (discussing the differences between new and refurbished goods:  “[t]here is an 
understanding on the part of consumers of used or refurbished products that such products will 
be degraded or will show signs of wear and tear and will not measure up to or perform at the 
same level as if new”). 
 315. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947). 
 316. See Koebler, supra note 9 (citing a CBP public affairs officer who related that the 
normal process after an initial detention by the CBP is to check with the trademark owners to 
confirm whether the goods are counterfeit); see also LKQ Corp., 369 F. Supp. 3d at 587. 
 317. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect for Small Businesses, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1491, 1543–47 (2012). 
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trademarks are being registered, could perhaps be for CBP officers to demand 
that manufacturers provide more concrete evidence that refurbished products 
are infringing—either that they are materially different and are likely to cause 
confusion or that they are counterfeit.318  The burden should be on the 
manufacturer to make a compelling case, not on the importer.319 
D.  Mandating Disclosure of Repair Information and Supply of 
Replacement Parts 
The fourth circle deals with certain affirmative duties that should be placed 
on original manufacturers in order to ensure an effective implementation of 
the right to repair.  This is perhaps the most controversial component of the 
right to repair and is the focus of the model state legislation.  Under section 
3(a) of the proposed model legislation, “an original equipment manufacturer 
shall make available, for purposes of diagnosis, maintenance, or repair . . . 
on fair and reasonable terms, documentation, parts, and tools, inclusive of 
any updates to information or embedded software.”320  The reason that this 
provision might be controversial is that it mandates affirmative action on the 
part of manufacturers that could run counter to their intellectual property 
rights.  The question is whether the proposed legislation, even if it passes, is 
sufficient without a provision for these legal measures in intellectual property 
law as well.  This section will examine this question—first, with respect to 
replacement parts and then with respect to repair information. 
1.  Replacement Parts 
To the extent that the measures proposed in Part III.C are not implemented 
in full—i.e., repair parts are not excluded from patent or trademark protection 
and there is no applicable exemption from infringement liability—there is a 
risk that the supply of parts by the manufacturer would be insufficient to meet 
demand and the parts that are supplied would not be offered at competitive 
prices.  This is where the proposal included in the model state legislation 
becomes relevant.  As noted above, the proposed bill would impose a duty 
on original manufacturers to make parts available on fair and reasonable 
terms, so long as such parts are available.321  Notably, this proposal is drafted 
broadly, without regard to whether the parts are protected by patents or 
trademarks.  Perhaps it could be limited to parts that are subject to patent or 
 
 318. Emails filed in the LKQ lawsuit show that some manufacturers provide little more 
than conclusive statements as to the counterfeit nature of the imported products. See Marquez 
Exhibit 1, LKQ Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 369 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D. Del. 2019) 
(1:18-cv-00225-GMS), ECF No. 11-1. 
 319. Of course, if such a proposal were adopted, the details of this would need to be further 
thought through, for example, to ensure that counterfeiters could not easily abuse this 
exemption. 
 320. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21, § 3(a). 
 321. Id. (“Nothing in this section requires an original equipment manufacturer to make 
available a part if the part is no longer available to the original equipment manufacturer.”). 
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trademark protection, provided that in other cases independent suppliers 
would have sufficient information to manufacture parts on their own. 
However, mandating supply of patented parts may be in direct conflict 
with the basic notions of patent law.  As the Supreme Court held in 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,322 excluding others is 
the essence of the patent, and the patent holder is not required to license its 
invention to others, even if it does not practice the invention on its own.323  
Thus, even if the duty to supply parts would be construed broadly—as 
allowing the patentee to license others to make and sell parts, rather than 
necessarily doing it all on its own—such duty does not align with the 
privilege that the patentee has under patent law to determine the extent to 
which it wishes to work its invention.324 
This direct conflict between the proposed state legislation and patent 
policy may pose a difficulty in passing the legislation.  Furthermore, even if 
the legislation passes in some states, it could be subject a constitutional 
challenge under the federal preemption doctrine.325  However, as noted 
above, California state law already requires manufacturers to provide such 
parts in certain circumstances (albeit interpreted narrowly by the Ninth 
Circuit to mean that such parts are required to be provided only to authorized 
repair networks).326 
Another route to ensure supply of patented parts is through compulsory 
licenses.  However, the United States has been, for many years, a vigorous 
opponent of compulsory licenses in patent law.327  This is not likely to change 
 
 322. 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
 323. Id. at 425; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (instructing the courts not to deny 
infringement remedies to a patentee for a refusal “to license or use any rights to the patent”). 
 324. A patentee’s refusal to sell or license could nevertheless count as an antitrust violation 
in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 
1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that Kodak’s refusal to sell replacement parts to independent 
service organizations constitutes an illegal attempt to monopolize the market for service of 
Kodak photocopiers).  Most importantly, in an earlier round of the litigation, the Supreme 
Court held that even though an equipment manufacturer lacked significant market power for 
its equipment, it could have sufficient market power in the secondary market for repair parts 
to be liable under the antitrust laws for its anticompetitive conduct in the aftermarket. See 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465–71 (1992).  In his dissent, 
Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned that once customers are committed to the particular brand by 
having purchased a product, they are “locked in” and no longer have any realistic alternative 
to turn to for repair parts. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  But see generally In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the imposition of 
antitrust liability on Xerox for refusing to sell patented parts and license patented and 
copyrighted software to independent service organizers that compete with Xerox in the 
aftermarket); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(declining to impose antitrust liability on a computer manufacturer for its refusal to license its 
diagnostic software to third-party maintenance providers). 
 325. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
 326. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.03 (West 2019); Bahr v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 656 F. App’x 
276, 277 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 327. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 n.21 (1980) (noting 
that “[c]ompulsory licensing of patents often has been proposed, but it has never been enacted 
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in the near future and, thus, the prospect of implementing this measure is 
rather slim.  At the very least, courts should exercise their discretion under 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.328 to avoid granting injunctions in 
infringement actions against alternative parts providers or users. 
In contrast to patent law, trademark law requires the manufacturer to 
continue using the mark in commerce if the replacement part is to remain 
protected by a trademark.329  This means that the manufacturer is required to 
make the products that include the part or else the manufacturer will lose the 
trademark.330  If the manufacturer continues to produce trademarked parts, 
then state legislation could be quite helpful to compel manufacturers, on 
anticompetitive and consumer protection grounds, to make their parts 
available to independent repair shops and consumers on a reasonable 
basis.331 
2.  Information 
The federal and state governments mandate disclosure of information on a 
routine basis, particularly where there are concerns of anticompetitive or 
deceptive practices—or on the grounds of consumer protection.  For 
example, securities law mandates the disclosure of certain information when 
offering any type of investment to the public.332  Another example that is 
more relevant to the model right to repair legislation is the Massachusetts 
Automotive Repair Law,333 which requires all motor vehicle manufacturers 
who sell cars in the state to provide the same diagnostic and repair 
 
on a broad scale”); WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 296 (6th ed. 2007) (noting the 
hostility of the United States with respect to compulsory licensing); John H. Barton, Patents 
and Antitrust:  A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 458 (1997) (noting that the idea of compulsory licensing is strongly 
opposed in the United States); Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and 
Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34, 43 n.18 (1995) (noting that compulsory 
licensing “remains disfavored in patent law”); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over 
Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union:  An 
Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 
1681 (2001) (describing the “traditional antipathy in U.S. law toward any incursions on a 
patent holder’s monopoly”).  Nevertheless, there are a few concrete compulsory license 
arrangements in various contexts—for example with respect to the exploitation of certain 
inventions in the field of atomic energy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2012). 
 328. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 329. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K (2019) (requiring car manufacturers to provide 
diagnostic repair information and tools for repair to independent repair facilities). 
 332. For an example, see Updated Investor Bulletin:  Crowdfunding for Investors, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-
bulletins/ib_crowdfunding-.html [https://perma.cc/S2DX-HBM8]. 
 333. GEN. ch. 93K § 2. 
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information to owners and independent repair shops (for a reasonable 
price).334 
The biggest roadblock here, in terms of intellectual property law, is trade 
secret law.  A trade secret is defined as information that:  (1) its owner has 
taken reasonable steps to keep secret, and (2) derives an actual or potential 
independent economic value from being a secret.335  Trade secret law is 
unique in intellectual property law in that, until recently, trade secret 
protection relied solely on state law.336  In 2016, Congress enacted the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act337 (DTSA), but the legislation does not preempt or 
displace state law.338  This means that state-based definitions of a trade secret 
(either through legislation or through judicial interpretation) can continue to 
coexist with a federal definition.339 
The implications of trade secret law are directly acknowledged by the 
model legislation in section 5(a), according to which:  “[n]othing in this Act 
shall be construed to require an original equipment manufacturer to divulge 
a trade secret to an owner or an independent service provider except as 
necessary to provide documentation, parts, and tools on fair and reasonable 
terms.”340  The model legislation refers to the definition of “trade secret” in 
the applicable state legislation (or in its absence, to the federal definition).  
The language of section 5(a) appears to treat information that is related to 
diagnostics, maintenance, or repair as information that cannot be protected 
as trade secrets and, therefore, can be released to independent repair shops. 
If states were to adopt this language, the law could be perceived as 
modifying trade secret law.  It is unsurprising, then, that many of the 
proposed bills do not adopt this carve-out.  Instead, they state:  “[n]othing in 
this Act shall be construed to require an original equipment manufacturer to 
divulge a trade secret” (or similar language to this effect).341  While the lack 
of a carve-out may make the proposed law more politically palatable, it does 
draw into question whether manufacturers can simply claim trade secret 
 
 334. Id. 
 335. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012). 
 336. Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of 
Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 833 (2017) (“The May 11, 2016 enactment 
of the DTSA created a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation for the 
first time.  For over 175 years, state law governed civil trade secret principles in the 
U.S. . . . .”). 
 337. Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 28, and 34 U.S.C.). 
 338. See 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (Supp. 2018). 
 339. Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 336, at 905 (noting that on its face, the federal 
definition appears to be narrower in how it defines “information”). 
 340. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, supra note 21, § 5(a).  The Massachusetts 
Automotive Repair Law also excludes from its reach that which manufacturers claim to be a 
trade secret. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 3 (2019) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
to require a manufacturer to divulge a trade secret.”). 
 341. See, e.g., H.R. 1649, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Haw. 2018); H.R. 3030, 100th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 35 (Ill. 2017). 
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protection for all pertinent repair information.  This would diminish the 
effectiveness of right to repair laws.  While there have been no official claims 
of such occurrences under motor vehicle right to repair laws, such as the 
Massachusetts Automotive Repair Law, allegations of such actions and the 
potential for future actions have spurred conversations around amendments 
to the law in Massachusetts.342 
Thus, even if states were successful in passing any such laws in the coming 
years, the absence of a carve-out for repair information as a trade secret could 
enable manufacturers to evade the legislation.  Surely, to be classified as a 
“trade secret,” the information must meet the applicable statutory 
requirements, including that the owner has taken reasonable measures to 
keep the information secret.343  When information is readily shared with 
authorized dealers (and their repair personnel) all over the country, a 
plausible argument could be that the owner has not taken reasonable 
measures to protect the secrets. 
Unfortunately, repair shops that do not have information supplied to them 
due to the manufacturers’ assertion of a trade secret exemption may not have 
the means to initiate litigation challenging this assertion.  The straightforward 
way to resolve this would be to adopt the model legislation language 
regarding trade secrets or to delete the exemption for trade secrets altogether, 
as was proposed in California.344  If the language regarding trade secrets 
needs to remain as-is in order for states to pass the law, states could prevent 
the abuse of this loophole by imposing civil liabilities on manufacturers who 
knowingly violate the law.  Thus, states might impose liability for 
manufacturers who falsely assert that certain information is protected as a 
trade secret.345  For example, the 2018 proposed repair law in California 
would have authorized city, county, and the state government to impose 
increasingly higher civil fines on a daily basis per infraction.346  Provisions 
 
 342. H.R. 293, 191st Gen. Court, 1st Sess. (Mass. 2019) (“An Act to enhance, update and 
protect the 2013 Motor Vehicle Right to Repair Law and Consumer Rights.”); Murphy, supra 
note 43. 
 343. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005). 
 344. Assemb. 2110, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (as introduced by California Assembly, 
Feb. 8, 2018). 
 345. Both the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (which has 
served as the basis for trade secrets legislation in many states) include remedies provisions 
that are designed to impose consequences for the wrongful assertion of trade secrets. See 18 
U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) (2012) (awarding reasonable attorney’s fees); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 3(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005) (awarding damages for “willful and 
malicious misappropriation”).  On whether such provisions actually deter bad faith assertions 
of trade secrets, see Eric Goldman, Court Benchslaps Trade Secret Plaintiff and Counsel for 
Bad Faith Litigation—RBC Bearings v. Caliber, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 18, 
2016), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/08/court-benchslaps-trade-secret-plaintiff-
and-counsel-for-bad-faith-litigation-rbc-bearings-v-caliber.htm [https://perma.cc/EJ5L-
YAUD]. 
 346. Some other proposed bills also include civil penalties that range from $500 to $5000 
per violation—but authorize only the state attorney general to take action. See H.R. 3030, 
100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); H.R. 2122, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 
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like this one might increase the likelihood that manufacturers would comply 
with the law. 
IV.  POTENTIAL CRITICISM 
Part IV addresses a few potential lines of criticism against this Article’s 
proposal to stop intellectual property law from sabotaging a right to repair.  
Concerns regarding the quality of repair and an increase in counterfeiting or 
piracy are drawn directly from arguments made by opponents of the repair 
movement.  This Article also addresses a potential criticism about the 
economic loss for the original manufacturers in the event of an effective right 
to repair regime.  While opponents are likely driven by concerns about lower 
profits, opponents never directly address this argument—but this Article 
attempts to do so here.347  
A.  Quality of Repair 
As part of their objection to the proposed right to repair legislation, original 
manufacturers expressed concern that the quality of repairs would be 
compromised if performed by consumers and independent repair shops.348  
Hence, a potential criticism of this Article’s thesis could be that strengthening 
the right to repair in the manners recommended herein would ultimately 
decrease the quality of repairs. 
This concern is not substantiated because repairs under the proposed 
legislation would be made in a competitive market.  Consumers would likely 
switch to alternative repair services, such as repair services offered by the 
original manufacturer or its authorized agents, if independent repair shops 
could not make quality repairs.349  Absent any concrete market failures, the 
invisible hand of the market can presumably be trusted in this context.  In 
fact, opening repair markets for competition could result in the development 
of new repair tools and methods as well as in better diffusion of repair 
information, which could very well increase quality of independent repairs.  
It is likely that the more the original manufacturers support repair businesses 
rather than fighting them—for example, by offering replacement parts and 
repair manuals under fair and reasonable terms—the better the quality of 
repairs would be. 
 
2017).  As one of us has argued in a previous article, it may be difficult to obtain assistance 
from the state attorney general unless one is able to bring complaints from a large number of 
repair shops in that particular state. See Grinvald, supra note 195, at 448. 
 347. Andy Metzger, Proposal Expands ‘Right to Repair’ Movement to Electronics in 
Mass., TELEGRAM.COM (Sept. 27, 2017, 10:41 AM), https://www.telegram.com/news/ 
20170927/proposal-expands-right-to-repair-movement-to-electronics-in-mass 
[https://perma.cc/7FTC-SESL] (“They have a very strong economic interest in monopolizing 
repair . . . .” (quoting Gay Gordon-Byrne, executive director of the Repair Association)). 
 348. See, e.g., Letter from Rick Habben to David Harris, supra note 46. 
 349. There are a number of resources consumers may use to ensure that they are using 
reputable, quality repair shops, including Better Business Bureau ratings and other consumer 
reviews. 
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In any event, even to the extent that the concern regarding the quality of 
repairs is valid, it does not mean that the right to repair should be curtailed.  
To a large extent, the manufacturers’ argument in this context is paternalistic, 
and consumers should be allowed to choose “bad repairs” for lower prices 
over “good repairs” for higher prices.350  Original manufacturers can 
decrease the cost of their repair services to make them more attractive to 
consumers, or they can make authorized repair services more available.  
Inasmuch as repair of certain products implicates safety concerns—for 
instance, when the repairs are not made in a controlled environment—this 
can be addressed in the legislation itself, through tort law, or by direct 
regulation of the relevant practices. 
B.  Economic Loss for Manufacturers 
Another criticism of the legislation and this Article’s proposals could be 
that they would result in economic loss for the original equipment 
manufacturers, which would ultimately negatively impact their incentives to 
innovate and create new products for the benefit of society. 
Maintaining control over the markets for repair services and replacement 
parts most likely serves the economic interests of original manufacturers, at 
least in the short run.  Yet, we should not deviate from the principle of fair 
competition and simply grant manufacturers exclusive control over such 
markets.  Absent a strong justification to deviate from society’s default norm, 
competition must be preserved in repair and replacement parts markets.  Such 
a justification does not seem to exist.  In particular, there is no indication that 
manufacturers would not profit at a level that provides them sufficient 
incentive to invent and create new products absent control of the aftermarket 
for their goods. 
Where the costs of research and development exceed the primary market 
profits for a specific product, perhaps such a product should never have been 
developed to begin with.  In these cases, there is no justification to promote 
development of the product through the promise of rent-seeking in the 
aftermarket.  In any event, costs of research and development should be 
reflected in the pricing of the product rather than recovered in other markets.  
Manufacturers should not be allowed to predatorily price their products low 
and their repair services and replacement parts high to recoup on the 
unnaturally low product price.351 
 
 350. Clearly, though, consumers may not always get to decide on these matters.  With 
respect to auto parts, for instance, insurance companies may play a large role in choosing the 
quality level of repairs. 
 351. See, e.g., Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-
conduct/predatory-or-below-cost [https://perma.cc/5TTW-PC2Q] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) 
(“Consumers are harmed only if below-cost pricing allows a dominant competitor to knock its 
rivals out of the market and then raise prices to above-market levels for a substantial time.”).  
To be sure, some companies may increase product prices to make up for lost revenues in the 
markets for repair and replacement parts.  It is hard to predict the economic effects of 
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Notably, a business that makes efforts to facilitate repairs by its customers 
may actually experience a growth in business in the long run, inasmuch as 
the ability to repair a product is an important factor in consumers’ market 
choices.  As a side note, any decline in profits as a result of maintaining 
competition in the markets for repair services and replacement parts may 
push manufacturers to find other creative ways, which are simultaneously 
beneficial to society, to boost their profits.  Finally, it is important to 
remember that the connection between the scope of intellectual property 
protection and the level of incentives provided by the system is not 
necessarily linear.352  Thus, even though some of the proposals made in this 
Article may narrow the scope of certain intellectual property rights in limited 
contexts, this would not necessarily result in a corresponding decrease in 
incentives to innovate. 
C.  Increase in Counterfeiting or Theft of Intellectual Property 
Another criticism of the repair legislation is that its enactment will enable 
an increase in counterfeiting or the theft of intellectual property.  For 
example, in its letter to Illinois legislators, Wahl Clipper Corporation stated, 
Our manufacturing location helps us protect our confidential information 
and provides a competitive advantage.  If our competitors, who mainly 
make their clippers in Asia, obtained this confidential information because 
of [the proposed repair law], it would impact our ability to compete on a 
global scale and diminish an advantage of manufacturing in Illinois. . . .  As 
you can see, [intellectual property] is a very critical issue for us.353 
With respect to Wahl’s specific assertion of the increased ability to steal 
its intellectual property, it is clear that Wahl is referring to its trade secrets in 
how it manufactures its clippers.  As a point of fact, this type of trade secret 
is not contemplated as being within the ambit of the repair legislation as it is 
not related to repairing clippers.  The idea that information relating to repair, 
along with parts and tools, would increase intellectual property theft is simply 
a scare tactic and part of the rhetoric that does not seem to have a basis in 
reality.  While counterfeiting of all types of products is a reality, the repair 
information will not increase what is already happening. 
Counterfeiters could use repair information to improve the quality of their 
counterfeits, as they will have access to a better understanding of how the 
products work.  However, this too is unlikely to happen.  Counterfeiters are 
 
maintaining competition in those markets.  Yet, absent clear evidence that control of such 
markets is vital for preserving an optimal level of incentives, one cannot defend the use of 
intellectual property rights to suppress competition in repairs. 
 352. See Michal Shur-Ofry, IP and the Lens of Complexity, 54 IDEA 55, 96 (2013) (“The 
expectations that each increase in the scope of IP will lead to a proportionate increase in the 
level of innovation; that each limitation of that scope will result in a corresponding decrease 
in innovation; or that we can promote external socially desired values simply by limiting or 
calibrating the scope of intellectual property protection—are unrealistic.”). 
 353. Letter from Rick Habben to David Harris, supra note 46. 
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not interested in making high quality products.354  The business model of 
counterfeiting is premised on making products that are as minimally effective 
as necessary to deceive consumers.355  More investment is put into making 
sure the product mimics the look of the real thing than in making sure it 
functions like the real thing.356  This way, counterfeiters can maximize their 
return more effectively.  In addition, counterfeiters decide which products to 
counterfeit based on the demand for such products by consumers.  In Wahl’s 
case, the company claims to own 60 percent of the market share for 
clippers.357  If Wahl experiences any increase in counterfeiting of its clippers, 
it is not due to releasing repair information but it is due instead to its clippers’ 
apparent popularity. 
There is a purpose behind this rhetoric, aside from scare tactics.  If 
manufacturers, like Wahl, claim that there will be an increase in 
counterfeiting, this assists in their conversations with the CBP.  The CBP is 
active in partnering with manufacturers and encourages continuous 
manufacturer involvement by providing information and training.358  This 
type of narrative regarding a correlation between increased repair 
information and an increase in counterfeits would give manufacturers an 
additional tool to strengthen the basis on which the CBP already aggressively 
detains and seizes replacement parts and other shipments.359 
CONCLUSION 
The right to repair movement has been steadily gaining ground over the 
last few years and it is the authors’ hope that the momentum continues.  This 
Article focuses on the interface between a right to repair and intellectual 
property rights.  This Article’s general thesis is that intellectual property law 
should not prevent a right to repair from being fully implemented in the 
United States.  Indeed, the theoretical model developed in our Article 
 
 354. See Shane Hickey, Whether You’re Unaware or Don’t Care, Counterfeit Goods Pose 
a Serious Threat, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2018, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/dec/02/whether-youre-unaware-or-dont-care-
counterfeit-goods-pose-a-serious-threat [https://perma.cc/BJ8B-XFBT] (describing 
counterfeit children’s toys that contained high levels of toxic chemicals). 
 355. See Thorsten Staake, Frederic Thiesse & Elgar Fleisch, Business Strategies in the 
Counterfeit Market, 65 J. BUS. RES. 658, 661–62 (2012) (describing five groups of 
counterfeiters based on the types of counterfeit goods produced; four out of the five groups all 
created counterfeits of high visual quality—meaning they looked like the original product—
but they had varying degrees of functional quality). 
 356. See id. at 663–64 (discussing the business strategies of each group of counterfeiters); 
see also Hickey, supra note 354 (relating anecdotes regarding substandard functioning of 
counterfeit products). 
 357. Letter from Rick Habben to David Harris, supra note 46. 
 358. See CBP, CBP PUB. NO. 0136–0311, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT:  
HOW BUSINESSES CAN PARTNER WITH CBP TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS 7, 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Jan/ipr_guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/44K2-9FDG] (last modified on Jan. 31, 2018). 
 359. See id. at 2 (“CBP intercepts counterfeit and pirated goods that harm the U.S. economy 
and threaten the security, health, and safety of Americans.”). 
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supports a right to repair and leads to the conclusion that the implementation 
of such a right is fully consistent with intellectual property protection.  In 
fact, it can be justified by the very same policy considerations that are often 
used to justify intellectual property rights.  However, from a doctrinal point 
of view, this Article’s analysis points out that the concept of a right to repair 
and the proposed state legislation that seeks to secure it are not 
accommodated by the United States’ far-reaching intellectual property 
regime.  This Article’s framing of a right to repair in four concentric circles 
illustrates the specific areas where intellectual property law is implicated 
by—and may impede—a right to repair.  This Article has attempted to design 
practical solutions to these potential hurdles, such as repair-friendly 
interpretations of patent and trademark law doctrines.  For example, the 
courts could default in favor of repair in close cases of repair versus 
reconstruction.  Another beneficial measure could be to prevent intellectual 
property owners from asserting design patents or trademarks over 
replacement parts against those who are using them for repair purposes.  This 
Article also joins in the repair movement’s push to fix the DMCA by 
removing the provisions prohibiting the circumvention of digital locks (and 
in particular, the provisions that make transmission of relevant repair 
information illegal).  To supplement such reforms, this Article also 
recommends certain fine-tuning of the proposed state legislation.  For 
instance, legislatures should include language voiding contract provisions 
that negate a consumer’s right to repair her products.  It is the authors’ hope 
that all of this will assist in eliminating intellectual property law as a barrier 
to implementing a nationwide right to repair. 
